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Confronted by an increasingly expensive and fragmented health care system, public 
and private payers have established a series of reforms designed to lower costs and 
improve quality. A leading example is the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
establishment of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), where groups of providers 
voluntarily assume responsibility for the spending and quality outcomes of a population 
of Medicare beneficiaries. Studies suggest MSSP ACOs have achieved modest 
savings. However, prior research may overstate savings if ACOs strategically select for 
low-cost clinicians or drop high-cost clinicians.  
 
In Chapter I, I evaluated the effect of the MSSP on spending and quality while 
accounting for clinicians’ non-random entry and exit in the program, using the share of 
nearby clinicians in the MSSP as an instrumental variable. Hip fracture served as a 
falsification test. In instrumental variable models, the MSSP was not associated with 
spending ($6 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% confidence interval [CI], -$50, $63), any 
clinical quality indicator, or hip fracture (0.09 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; CI: -0.07, 
0.26). Adjusted longitudinal models — similar to what other ACO studies have 
estimated — failed the falsification test (-11% decrease in hip fracture), suggesting the 
presence of residual confounding. Highest-cost clinicians (99th percentile spending) had 
a 30.0% chance of exiting the MSSP compared to a 14.7% chance
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among median (50th percentile) clinicians. Together, these results suggest that exit of 
high-cost clinicians may drive estimates of savings. 
 
ACOs may also avoid sick or high-cost beneficiaries. To encourage ACOs to care for 
high-risk beneficiaries, MSSP savings benchmarks are adjusted by beneficiary risk 
score. To discourage coding intensification (“upcoding”), benchmarks are not adjusted 
upward if risk scores rise. In Chapter II, I evaluated the impact of this risk-adjustment 
policy. I examined whether MSSP exposure was associated with within-beneficiary risk 
score change and whether risk score was associated with beneficiary entry or exit. 
MSSP exposure was not associated with consistent changes in within-beneficiary risk 
score. Conversely, highest-risk beneficiaries (99th percentile of risk score) had a 25.1% 
chance of exiting the MSSP compared to a 16.0% chance among median-risk 
beneficiaries. I conclude the decision to not upwardly adjust risk score has successfully 
deterred coding increases but may have led ACOs to avoid high-risk beneficiaries. 
 
Why have ACOs struggled to improve spending and quality? One possibility is ACOs 
have not engaged frontline clinicians. In Chapter III, I surveyed 1,620 clinicians in the 
Physician Organization of Michigan ACO (response rate: 34%). I found limited ACO 
engagement: few clinicians participated in the decision to join the ACO (3%); few were 
aware of ACO incentives, including knowing the ACO was accountable for spending 
and quality (23%) or faced upside risk only (3%); and few agreed (moderately or 
strongly) the ACO changed compensation (20%) or practice (19%) or reduced 
inappropriate care (13%). However, increased ACO awareness (one standard 
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deviation) was associated with decreased difficulty implementing recommendations 
against low-value care (-2.3 percentage point; CI: -3.8, -0.8). I conclude limited clinician 
engagement may hamper efforts to reduce low-value care. 
 
Collectively, these results suggest that the MSSP has had little impact on spending and 
quality. Instead, selection effects – including strategic dropping of high-cost clinicians 
and high-risk beneficiaries – may drive estimates of improved performance. Future 
research should investigate how Medicare can structure incentives that motivate ACOs 





A remarkable consensus is developing – the current approach of separately paying 
physicians and hospitals for discrete services has inflated spending and fragmented 
care5–9 Yet this consensus hides disagreement about what should replace fee-for-
service (FFS) payment. At the heart of this disagreement lies an evidence gap: research 
is only beginning to understand which alternative payment models have the most 
potential to improve value.10–13 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
have most aggressively initiated payment reforms among FFS Medicare beneficiaries. 
Yet evaluating these reforms has proven challenging. CMS rarely randomizes, and 
providers have considerable discretion in whether and how they elect to participate in 
these reform. As a result, evaluations of these programs are subject to bias from 
volunteering effects and unintended consequences such as severity upcoding and 
patient cherry-picking.14,15 
 
Of the many reforms proposed to FFS, none has drawn more attention than 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).16–20 Under this payment model, groups of 
providers assume collective responsibility for the spending and quality outcomes of a 
defined group of patients. A leading example is the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP), where ACOs receive shared saving bonuses if they lower spending below a
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financial benchmark for attributed FFS Medicare beneficiaries while maintaining quality 
standards. Studies suggest that MSSP ACOs are associated with modest savings.21–24 
 
However, prior research may overstate savings in this voluntary program if ACOs 
strategically select for low-cost clinicians or drop high-cost clinicians. Clinicians and 
provider groups may choose to join, or be recruited to join, ACOs because of their ability 
to deliver efficient care. Conversely, the ability of MSSP ACOs to drop clinicians with 
high-cost patients provides ACOs with a straightforward means of lowering measured 
spending.25 In Chapter I of my thesis, I evaluated the effect of the MSSP on spending 
and quality while accounting for clinicians’ non-random entry and exit to and from MSSP 
ACOs. To account for selection effects, I used the share of nearby clinicians 
participating in the MSSP as an instrumental variable. I also used hip fracture as a 
falsification test. 26 Because hip fracture incidence should not be affected by medical 
practice (or ACOs) in the near term and invariably requires hospitalization (i.e., not 
subject to variation in diagnostic intensity), any observed association between the 
MSSP and hip fracture would suggest the presence of residual confounding between 
ACOs and controls not addressed by a given statistical model. 27–29 
 
In instrumental variable models, the MSSP was not significantly associated with 
changes in spending ($6 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI, -$50 to $63), any clinical 
quality indicator, or hip fracture (hospitalization rate of 0.09 per 1000 beneficiary-
quarters; 95% CI: -0.07 to 0.26). Adjusted longitudinal models — similar to what other 
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studies have used to estimate the impact of ACOs — failed the falsification test (hip 
fracture hospitalization, -0.24 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -0.33 to -0.17), 
suggesting residual confounding from unobserved patient severity. Prior to the start of 
the MSSP, spending trends were also different between beneficiaries who did and did 
not eventually enter the MSSP. In supplemental analyses, I found that high-cost 
clinicians were disproportionately likely to exit MSSP ACOs. Together, these results 
suggest that selection effects – including strategic dropping of high-cost clinicians – may 
drive estimates of savings in the MSSP. 
 
ACOs may also try to avoid sick beneficiaries or beneficiaries with high anticipated 
spending.25 To encourage ACOs to care for high-risk beneficiaries, savings benchmarks 
in the MSSP are adjusted by beneficiaries’ Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score. To minimize ACOs’ incentive 
to raise benchmarks by increased diagnostic coding,15,30–32 CMS ruled that the 
benchmark cannot be adjusted upward if the risk score rises while the beneficiary is in 
the MSSP. 33–35 If the risk score falls, however, the benchmark is adjusted downward. 
Because CMS’ approach does not capture growth in risk score over time, ACOs face an 
incentive to drop high-risk beneficiaries with increasing comorbidities or acute illness, 
i.e., “favorable selection.” The fact that beneficiaries are attributed to ACOs at the end of 
the performance year rather than its beginning (i.e., retrospective attribution) based on a 
known subset of claims submitted by the ACOs themselves provides ACOs with a 
means of avoiding beneficiaries who become acutely sick or more expensive during the 
performance period. At the same time, because this risk adjustment system still 
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penalizes ACOs whose beneficiaries’ risk scores (and spending benchmarks) fall, ACOs 
must remain vigilant in maintaining coding intensity at or above current levels. 
 
In Chapter II of my thesis, I examined the relationship between the MSSP and risk 
profiles in a cohort of beneficiaries continuously enrolled in FFS Medicare from 2008 
through 2014. I found limited evidence that exposure to the MSSP increased within-
beneficiary risk score. At the same time, high-risk beneficiaries were disproportionately 
likely to exit MSSP ACOs: highest-risk beneficiaries (99th percentile of risk score) had a 
25.1% chance of exiting the MSSP compared to a 16.0% chance among median-risk 
beneficiaries (50th percentile). MSSP exit was particularly concentrated among 
beneficiaries who exhibited high growth in risk score while in the MSSP and following 
exit from the program. Additional analyses suggested that exit by clinicians with high-
risk panels drove exit of high-risk beneficiaries from the MSSP. These findings suggest 
that CMS’ decision to not upwardly adjust risk score in the MSSP has successfully 
deterred coding increases but may have led ACOs to avoid high-risk beneficiaries with 
increasing comorbidities or acute illness. 
 
Evidence from Chapters II and III suggest ACOs have had difficulty improving spending 
and quality in the MSSP. Instead, it appears that ACOs have relied, at least in part, on 
strategically dropping high-cost clinicians and high-risk beneficiaries to reduce 




Why have MSSP ACOs had so much difficulty achieving meaningful improvements to 
spending and quality? One possibility is that ACOs have struggled to engage the 
frontline clinicians charged with achieving ACO objectives. Since the inception of the 
ACO model, policymakers and physician leaders have commented on the need to 
increase clinician awareness of ACO goals, provide useful performance data, and foster 
effective incentives aligning clinician and ACO objectives.7,9,19,36–44 Whether this has 
occurred is largely unknown. Most empirical studies have relied on executive surveys 
and interviews with ACO leadership,10,20,45–48 with only one survey targeting individual 
clinicians (i.e., primary care physicians and internal medicine specialists) during the 
early ACO experience (2014-2015).48 
 
In Chapter III of this thesis, I examined the perspective of frontline clinicians, a 
dimension of ACOs that has been largely missing from policy conversations. I designed 
and administered a novel survey to individual clinicians in the Physician Organization of 
Michigan MSSP ACO. With approximately 80,000 attributed beneficiaries, the POM 
ACO is the largest MSSP ACO in Michigan and among the ten largest in the United 
States.49 To evaluate the mechanisms by which ACOs’ collective incentives are 
transmitted to individual clinicians, I integrated previous methodologies from surveys 
that have separately assessed clinicians’ engagement in payment reform and clinicians’ 




In the largest survey of ACO clinicians to date (n=1,620 respondents), I found limited 
ACO engagement of frontline clinicians: few clinicians participated in the decision to join 
the ACO (3%); few were aware of ACO incentives, including knowing that the ACO was 
accountable for both spending and quality (23%), successfully lowered spending (9%), 
or faced upside risk only (3%); and few reported the ACO changed compensation 
(moderate to strong agreement, 20%), overall practice (19%), or feedback (15%) or that 
it improved care coordination (17%), inappropriate care (13%), or unnecessary 
hospitalizations (12%). At the same time, greater clinician engagement – in particular, 
greater awareness of ACO incentives and perceived ability to improve care quality – 
was associated with less difficulty implementing recommendations against low-value 
services. For example, increased ACO awareness (one standard deviation) was 
associated with decreased difficulty (-2.3 percentage point) implementing 
recommendations against low-value care (95% CI: -3.8, -0.8), representing an 8% 
improvement. Taken together, our results suggest that limited engagement of ACO 
clinicians may hamper ACO efforts to achieve spending and quality. 
 
Based on this work, what can I conclude about ACOs and their potential to improve 
upon the FFS paradigm? The pathologies of FFS structure are well-known.50 Yet the 
ACO model always risked introducing new problems. ACOs, like any global payments 
holding providers accountable for total costs of care, raise the possibility that providers 
will avoid sick beneficiaries or drop the clinicians that care for them.30,51 While CMS 
sought to lessen this incentive by using beneficiary risk score to adjust MSSP 
benchmarks, concerns about coding intensification led CMS to not upwardly adjust 
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benchmarks once beneficiaries are in the MSSP. 33–35 ACOs still face an incentive to 
avoid patients with increasing comorbidities or acute illness. Evidence from this thesis 
suggests that ACOs have acted upon this incentive: high-cost clinicians and their 
patient panels are more likely to exit the MSSP. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
MSSP ACOs may be strategically dropping high-cost clinicians and avoiding high-risk 
beneficiaries. 
 
The tension between appropriate risk adjustment and inappropriate changes in coding 
practices, already evident during early MSSP rulemaking, will increase rapidly as the 
MSSP transitions to regional benchmarks and two-sided risk contracts. What can be 
done to reduce favorable selection of beneficiaries and clinicians while minimizing 
coding changes in the MSSP? The most obvious solution is better risk adjustment. For 
instance, CMS could incorporate additional social risk factors (e.g., race) into the 
diagnosis-based risk score methodology.52,53 However, this would not capture growth in 
chronic or acute illness, which I found to be strongly associated with MSSP exit 
independent of race. Instead, CMS could adjust for beneficiaries’ pre-existing “risk 
velocities” (e.g., growth in patient risk score) in the years prior to MSSP attribution. 
 
A second solution is making it more difficult for ACOs to avoid high-risk beneficiaries or 
drop clinicians with high-risk patient panels. Prospective attribution – used in the Next 
Generation and MSSP Track 3 models – may help prevent ACOs from dropping 
beneficiaries during the performance year and prior to attribution. Likewise, the MSSP 
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could modify or rescind ACOs’ ability to modify the roster of ACO provider participants 
year-to-year over the course of a single ACO contract.25 Finally, CMS could couple 
efforts to improve risk adjustment and reduce favorable selection with aggressive 
auditing of compositional changes and coding practices in the MSSP. Although CMS 
has repeatedly stated in each MSSP Final Rule that it plans to do this,33–35 it is uncertain 
whether this has occurred. 
 
Encouraging clinicians and hospitals to take accountability for spending and quality 
while minimizing unintended consequences remains a central challenge in health care 
reform.30,54 The evidence presented in this thesis suggest that the MSSP has had little 
success in achieving this objective and may have prompted ACOs to avoid the 
beneficiaries most likely to benefit from efforts to improve spending and quality. 
Nonetheless, the ACO experiment remains relatively new. It is unknown if the MSSP or 
future ACO models can better balance these competing objectives. Only through 
continued rigorous policy evaluation will we be able to answer these questions and 




Chapter I. Changes in spending and quality in the Medicare Shared Savings 




Importance: Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) are associated with modest savings. However, prior research 
may overstate this effect if high-cost clinicians disproportionately exit MSSP ACOs. 
 
Objective: To evaluate the effect of the MSSP on spending and quality while 
accounting for clinicians’ non-random exit from MSSP ACOs. 
 
Design, settings, participants: A 20% random sample of Medicare fee-for-service 
beneficiaries was used to compare performance among MSSP ACOs versus controls 
from 2008 through 2014 (N=97,795,756 beneficiary-quarters). Similar to prior MSSP 
analyses, adjusted longitudinal models accounted for secular trends, market factors, 
and beneficiary characteristics. To account further for selection effects, the share of 
nearby clinicians participating in the MSSP was used as an instrumental variable. We 
also tested for compositional changes among MSSP participants and whether these
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changes affected spending estimates. Changes in rates of hip fracture served as a 
falsification outcome. 
 
Exposure: Beneficiary attribution to an MSSP ACO. 
 
Main outcomes. Total spending, 4 clinical quality indicators, and hip fracture. 
 
Results: In adjusted longitudinal models, the MSSP was associated with modest 
reductions in spending (-$117 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI, -$150, -$85) and 
improvements in 2 out of 4 clinical quality indicators. In instrumental variable models, 
the MSSP was not significantly associated with changes in spending ($6 per 
beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI, -50, 63) or any clinical quality indicator. In falsification 
tests, the MSSP was associated with changes in hip fracture in the adjusted model (-
0.24 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -0.32, -0.17) but not instrumental variable 
model (0.06 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -0.10, 0.20). Estimated savings 
decreased in models accounting for fixed differences across beneficiaries (-$88 per 
beneficiary-quarter), ACOs (-$57 per beneficiary-quarter), and clinicians (-$31 per 
beneficiary-quarter; all P<.001). Compositional changes were driven by ACOs dropping 
high-cost clinicians: clinicians in the 99th percentile of spending had a 30.0% chance of 
exiting the MSSP, compared to a 14.7% chance among median-cost (50th percentile) 




Conclusions and relevance: After accounting for clinicians’ non-random entry and exit 
to and from the program, the MSSP was not associated with improvements in spending 
or quality. Selection effects – including exit of high-cost clinicians – may drive estimates 






Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are arguably the most widespread and far-
reaching value-based reform in the United States, with over 900 ACO contracts 
covering more than 32 million lives.17 A leading example is the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (MSSP), in which groups of clinicians, hospitals, and other providers 
voluntarily assume responsibility for the spending and quality outcomes of a defined 
population of fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare beneficiaries. Evidence suggests that 
MSSP ACOs are associated with modest spending and quality improvements.21–23  
 
However, evaluations of the MSSP may be subject to confounding from non-random 
participation or attrition within ACOs. Clinicians and provider groups may choose to join, 
or be recruited to join, ACOs because of their desire or ability to deliver high-quality and 
efficient care.48 These providers may also simultaneously engage in other payment 
reforms such as Medicare Advantage (MA) that could lower spending.55,56 Conversely, 
ACOs may selectively drop high-cost clinicians from their contracts to reduce measured 
spending and earn shared savings.25 Despite these selective pressures operating at the 
clinician, provider group, and MSSP contracting level, research to date has not 
identified the degree to which selection bias may affect evaluations of the MSSP. 
 
In this study, we used national Medicare data to evaluate changes in spending and 
quality performance while accounting for selection effects in the MSSP. Similar to 
previous analyses, we estimated adjusted longitudinal models that account for secular 
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trends, market-level factors, and observed differences across MSSP participants and 
local controls. To account for clinicians’ non-random entry and exit to and from the 
MSSP, we used the share of clinicians participating in the MSSP within a 50-mile radius 
of a given clinician’s practice location as an instrumental variable. We also tested for 
changes in the composition of MSSP participants over time and whether these 




Data Sources and Study Population. We analyzed national claims data from 2008 
through 2014 for a random 20% sample of Medicare FFS beneficiaries 65 years of age 
or older. MSSP participation was defined using CMS’ ACO Provider- and Beneficiary-
level files, which list the beneficiaries, clinicians, and provider groups participating in the 
MSSP. Following CMS’ MSSP specifications 57, ACO beneficiaries were attributed to 
the provider group and clinician (defined by the Taxpayer Identification Number [TIN]) 
within their ACO from which they received the plurality of eligible evaluation and 
management services.. An analogous method was followed for attributing control 
beneficiaries to non-MSSP provider groups and clinicians. To improve comparability to 
prior work 21,22,58, we restricted analyses to beneficiaries attributed using claims 
submitted by a primary care clinician (i.e., step one of the MSSP attribution process) 




As specified by the MSSP,57 we excluded beneficiaries who were ineligible for 
attribution to an MSSP ACO, enrolled in Medicare Advantage, or not continuously 
enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B. To improve comparability between MSSP 
beneficiaries and controls, we also excluded beneficiaries residing outside of a hospital 




Primary and Secondary Outcomes. Our primary study outcome was total price-
standardized Medicare spending per beneficiary per quarter. Price-standardization 
accounted for variation resulting from regional wage indices and payments for indirect 
medical education, Disproportionate Share Hospitals, and new technologies.59 
 
To ensure comparability to previous studies,21–23,60 we included the following secondary 
outcomes: (A) component spending for inpatient, outpatient, professional, and skilled 
nursing facility services; (B) quality indicators, including indicators for diabetes (glycated 
hemoglobin testing, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol testing, diabetic retinal 
examinations) and mammography; and (C) hospital utilization, including rates of all-
cause hospitalization, preventable hospitalization (hospitalization for 1 of 11 ambulatory 





As a falsification test, we evaluated the effect of the MSSP on the rate of hospitalization 
for hip fracture.26 We selected hip fracture as a falsification outcome for two reasons. 
First, because medical practice is unlikely to affect hip fracture in the near term, recent 
reforms such as ACOs are unlikely to affect population incidence rates during our study 
period. Thus, observed changes in hip fracture would suggest the presence of residual 
confounding between ACOs and controls. Second, because hip fracture requires 
hospitalization, it is less subject to changes in diagnostic intensity or treatment 
preferences potentially correlated with ACO participation.27 Previous research has 
demonstrated hip fracture hospitalization rates to be a sensitive indicator of true 
population incidence.28,29 (See Methods in Appendix A.) 
 
Exposure. We defined beneficiary attribution to the MSSP using a time-varying 
indicator that equaled 1 if the beneficiary was attributed to an MSSP ACO in a given 
quarter, 0 otherwise. This captured ACOs’ staggered entry into MSSP contracts (April 
2012, July 2012, January 2013, January 2014) and the ability of participants to enter 
and exit ACOs each year. Following reports that MSSP savings are concentrated 
among early entrants,21–23 we also evaluated spending changes across ACOs’ year of 
entry into MSSP contracts. 
 
Instrumental Variable – MSSP Supply. We hypothesized that clinicians practicing 
closer to other MSSP providers would be more likely to join and remain in MSSP ACOs 
but would but would otherwise be similar to local clinicians. Our instrument is 
conceptually similar to the canonical “differential distance” instrument,63–65 which 
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exploits the fact that beneficiaries residing relatively closer to specialized hospitals 
versus other hospitals are more likely to receive specialized care. Similar to the use of 
differential distance to address non-random selection of patients into treatments, we 
hypothesized that “MSSP supply” could address non-random selection of clinicians and 
provider groups into and out of MSSP ACOs. 
 
In each quarter, MSSP supply was defined as the ratio of MSSP clinicians to all 
clinicians within a 50-mile radius of the clinician’s practice location, after discounting the 
supply of clinicians who were relatively further away within the 50-mile radius.66 The 
discount factor was estimated by modeling how the likelihood of two clinicians 
participating in the same MSSP ACO varied by the inverse distance between those two 
clinicians66,67 and was allowed to vary across urban, large rural, small rural, or isolated 
ZIP codes (Methods, Figure A1, and Table A1 of Appendix A).68–70 We tested the 
robustness of the instrumental variable using MSSP supply restricted to a 10-, 25-, 50-, 
75-, or 150-mile radius, with or without discounting. In contrast to standard longitudinal 
models, instrumental variable models capture treatment effects among marginal 
clinicians, i.e., those participating in the MSSP due to greater exposure to MSSP 
supply. 
 
Statistical Analysis. We estimated 2 sets of linear regression models for each 
spending and quality outcome. First, similar to previous evaluations, we estimated 
adjusted longitudinal models comparing concurrent changes in spending and quality 
between MSSP participants and local controls within the same health care market, as 
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defined by HRR. 12,21–23,58,71 These models included a quarterly indicator for MSSP 
attribution, market fixed effects, year fixed effects, seasonal indicators, and beneficiary 
characteristics. As in prior studies, we adjusted for beneficiary age, sex, race/ethnicity 
(white, black, Hispanic, or other/unknown), disability, end-stage renal disease, dual-
eligibility for Medicaid (months of enrollment), the CMS Hierarchical Condition Category 
(HCC) risk score, and area-level poverty (proportion below federal poverty level) and 
education (proportion graduated from high school, college).72 
 
Next, to examine whether non-random entry and exit to and from the MSSP affects 
estimates of spending and quality in the MSSP, we estimated instrumental variable 
models that were analogous to the adjusted longitudinal model but used MSSP supply 
as an instrumental variable. By integrating MSSP supply into a longitudinal framework, 
these models specifically used within-market changes to MSSP supply to identify the 
effect of the MSSP, thus accounting for secular trends and fixed differences across 
markets that could confound the relationship between MSSP supply and local 
performance changes. (Model details are provided in Methods in Appendix A.) 
 
As a falsification test, we estimated the effect of the MSSP on the rate of hospitalization 
for hip fracture using the adjusted longitudinal model and the instrumental variable 
model. Because the MSSP should not affect hip fracture rates during our study period, 
observed associations would suggest the presence of residual confounding not fully 




Compositional changes. To identify the degree to which changes in the composition of 
MSSP participants drives performance estimates, we estimated changes in spending 
and hip fracture (the falsification outcome) using supplemental longitudinal models that 
included: (1) market-year fixed effects, capturing market-specific spending trends; (2) 
beneficiary fixed effects; (3) market-year and ACO fixed effects, with ACOs defined by 
groups of TINs ultimately forming MSSP ACOs;21,22,60 or (4) clinician fixed effects 
(Methods in Appendix A). Differences across these models would indicate the influence 
of compositional changes on standard longitudinal estimates. Models including market-
year and ACO fixed effects are most comparable to those used in the principal MSSP 
evaluations.12,21–23,58,71 We tested instrumental variable robustness in a similar manner, 
estimating changes in spending and hip fracture in models that included: (1) market-
year fixed effects; (2) market-year and ACO fixed effects; or (3) MSSP supply restricted 
to a 10-, 25-, 50-, 75-, or 150-mile radius, with or without discounting. 
 
In supplemental analyses, we evaluated two potential mechanisms underlying changes 
in the composition of MSSP participants or their practice environment. First, we 
assessed whether MSSP ACOs strategically recruit or prune providers according to 
spending performance in the program. Specifically, we tested whether a clinician’s or 
provider group’s spending performance in the prior year predicted the probability of the 
clinician or provider group entering or exiting an existing MSSP ACO in the subsequent 
year. (Details provided in Methods in Appendix A.) Second, we analyzed whether MA 
penetration, a proxy for managed care, was associated with MSSP penetration at the 
county level. For these analyses, we estimated linear regression models with year fixed 
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effects and either market fixed effects (MSSP entry/exit) or county fixed effects (MA 
penetration analyses). If accounting for county-level MA penetration reduced savings 
estimates of ACOs, it would suggest that other time-varying changes occurring 
alongside ACOs may introduce bias into standard estimates. 
 
All analyses specified robust standard errors to account for clustering at the market 
level. Statistical analyses were performed using Stata version 15.1. Our study was 




MSSP Participation and Spending. Medicare FFS beneficiaries contributed 
97,795,756 beneficiary-quarters from 2008 through 2014 (6,105,325 unique 
beneficiaries). MSSP participants included 852,964 beneficiaries, 30,813 clinicians, 
7,086 provider groups, and 337 ACOs from 2012 through 2014. Average Medicare 
spending per beneficiary-quarter was $2,336 (standard deviation: $7,319). 
 
Instrument Validity. Before estimating instrumental variable models, we confirmed the 
validity of MSSP supply as an instrumental variable.73 First, MSSP supply was highly 
correlated with MSSP participation (F1,306 statistic = 444), where instruments with F-
statistics above 10 are considered strong.74 Second, beneficiary covariates were 
extremely well-balanced across MSSP supply (Table I.1). Third, spending trends in the 
pre-MSSP period were similar between beneficiaries with high versus low MSSP supply 
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(differential trend, –$2 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: -$4 to -$1; Figure A2 and Table 
A2 in Appendix A). 
 
In contrast, across observed MSSP status, MSSP beneficiaries were less likely to be 
dual-eligible or disabled, have substantial comorbidity, or live in areas with high poverty 
or low educational attainment (Table I.1). Further, spending trends in the pre-period 
differed substantially between beneficiaries who did and did not eventually enter the 
MSSP (differential trend, $18 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: $16 to $19; Figure A3 
and Table A2 in Appendix A), a violation of the parallel trends assumption. These 
findings suggest that unobserved sources of selection bias were more evenly distributed 
across MSSP supply than observed MSSP status. 
 
Changes in Spending. Figure I.1 shows the association between the MSSP and 
spending in the adjusted longitudinal and instrumental variable models. In the adjusted 
longitudinal model, the MSSP was associated with a modest reduction in total spending 
(-$117 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% confidence interval [CI], -$150 to -$85). Savings in 
the adjusted model were due to reductions in inpatient (-$58 per beneficiary-quarter; 
95% CI: -$73, -$43), outpatient (-$17 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: -$25, -$8), and 
skilled nursing facility (-$41 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: -$55, -$26) services. In the 
instrumental variable model, the MSSP was not associated with changes in total 
spending ($6 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI, -$50 to $63). The instrumental variable 
spending estimate differed significantly from the adjusted estimate (difference-in-Sargan 
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test, P<.001; Table A3 in Appendix A).75 Estimated savings were smaller in models 
across ACOs’ year of entering the MSSP (Figure A4 in Appendix A). 
 
Falsification Test. Figure I.1 shows the results of the falsification test. In the adjusted 
longitudinal model, the MSSP was associated with a substantial decrease in the 
falsification outcome, rate of hospitalization for hip fracture (-0.24 per 1000 beneficiary-
quarters; 95% CI: -0.32, -0.17). This represents an 11% decrease in the rate of hip 
fracture hospitalization (≈ -0.24 / adjusted mean of 2.12). In contrast, the MSSP was not 
associated with hip fracture in the instrumental variable model (0.05 per 1000 
beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -0.10, 0.20). The instrumental variable estimate for hip 
fracture differed significantly from the adjusted estimate (difference-in-Sargan test, 
P=.001; Table A3 in Appendix A).75 
 
Effects of Compositional Change. Figure I.1 shows the large influence of 
compositional changes on estimates of the MSSP. There was a consistent decrement in 
the association between the MSSP and hip fracture (the falsification outcome) in models 
that controlled for fixed differences across market-years (-0.29 per 1000 beneficiary-
quarters; 95% CI: -0.37, -0.20; Panel A), beneficiaries (-0.20 per 1000 beneficiary-
quarters; 95% CI: -0.28, -0.12), ACOs (-0.16 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -
0.23, -0.09), and clinicians (-0.06 per 1000 beneficiary-quarters; 95% CI: -0.12, -0.01). 
The association between the MSSP and spending (Panel B) followed a similar pattern: 
estimates of total savings decreased in models that accounted for fixed differences 
across market-years (-$124 per beneficiary-quarter), beneficiaries (-$88 per beneficiary-
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quarter), ACOs (-$59 per beneficiary-quarter), and clinicians (-$31 per beneficiary-
quarter; all P<.001). 
 
In contrast, the MSSP was not associated with spending or hip fracture in the 
instrumental variable model. This finding was robust across a wide range of 
specifications, including instrumental variable models using market-year fixed effects, 
market-year and ACO fixed effects, or MSSP supply restricted to a 25-, 50-, 75-, or 150-
mile radius, with or without discounting (Figure A6 and Table A4 in Appendix A). 
Although changes in MSSP and MA penetration were modestly associated at the county 
level (Figure A5 in Appendix A), adjustment for MA penetration did not affect adjusted 
longitudinal or instrumental variable estimates (Table A4 in Appendix A). 
 
Changes in Quality and Hospital Use. The MSSP was associated with improvements 
in two of the four clinical quality indicators in the adjusted longitudinal model but not the 
instrumental variable model (Figure I.3). In the adjusted model, the MSSP was 
associated with increased rates of glycated hemoglobin testing among beneficiaries 
with diabetes (2.4 percentage point [p.p.] per quarter; 95% CI: 0.3, 4.5) and 
mammography (0.6 p.p. per quarter; 95% CI: 0.3, 1.0). In the instrumental variable 
model, the MSSP was not associated with changes in any quality indicator, with 
estimates for all four indicators differing significantly from adjusted estimates (Table A3 
in Appendix A). The MSSP was associated with modest decreases in all-cause 
hospitalizations and preventable hospitalizations in the adjusted model but not the 
instrumental variable model; conversely, reductions in all-cause 30-day readmissions 
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and emergency department visits were observed in both adjusted and instrumental 
variable models (Figure A7 in Appendix A). 
 
Participation and Attrition Within MSSP ACOs. In 2013 and 2014, 4,297 and 4,574 
clinicians exited and entered already-formed MSSP ACOs, respectively. Figure I.4 
shows the relationship between a clinician’s spending performance in the MSSP and 
subsequent exit or entry from the program. Clinicians in the 95th and 99th percentile of 
average spending had a 23.0% and 30.0% chance of exiting the MSSP in the next year, 
as compared to a 14.7% chance among median-spending (50th percentile) clinicians, a 
risk difference of 8.4% and 15.3%, respectively, both P<.001; Table A5 in Appendix A). 
Results were robust when using clinicians’ average spending performance in the prior 
one or two years or when not adjusting for average beneficiary characteristics (Figure 
A8 in Appendix A). Entry into already-formed ACOs was also modestly higher among 
clinicians in the 99th percentile of prior spending as compared to median-spending 
clinicians (risk difference, 3.6%, P<.001; Figure 4 and Appendix Table A5 in Appendix 
A). Conversely, MSSP entry and exit by provider groups was less common and not 




Participation in MSSP ACOs was not associated with improvements in spending, 
quality, or hip fracture (the falsification outcome) in our instrumental variable analysis. In 
contrast, adjusted longitudinal models — similar to what other studies have used to 
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estimate the impact of ACOs — failed our falsification test. Prior to the start of the 
MSSP, spending trends were also different between beneficiaries who did and did not 
eventually enter the program. Supplemental analyses found that high-cost clinicians 
were disproportionately likely to exit MSSP ACOs. Together, our results suggest that 
improved quality and spending performance in this voluntary program may have been 
driven by clinicians’ non-random participation and attrition in the MSSP. 
 
Our conclusion that the MSSP was not associated with improvements in spending, 
quality, or most measures of hospital use differs from previous Medicare ACO 
evaluations.12,21–23,58,71 Our instrumental variable models address selection effects not 
directly captured in previous evaluations. The influence of compositional changes within 
the MSSP is highlighted by the consistent reduction in estimates of both savings and hip 
fracture that occurred with progressively greater adjustment for fixed differences across 
MSSP participants and controls. Instrumental variable models may address these 
compositional changes by evaluating spending and quality among clinicians who join 
and remain in the MSSP due to their proximity to other MSSP clinicians rather than their 
record of spending performance in the program. 
 
The ability of MSSP ACOs to recruit or drop clinicians provides ACOs with a relatively 
straightforward means of lowering measured spending.25 Our finding that high-cost 
clinicians disproportionally exit the MSSP is consistent with a recent study showing that 
clinicians with higher predicted spending were more likely to leave Partners HealthCare 
Pioneer ACO.25 Conversely, we found no evidence that MSSP ACOs recruit low-cost 
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clinicians. This may be because ACOs can more readily observe spending of clinicians 
already in their ACO than the performance of those who have not yet joined. 
 
Pruning high-cost clinicians from ACO contracts could have large effects on spending 
estimates and may contribute to reported findings that MSSP savings grow over time.22 
For example, dropping clinicians in the top 95th or 99th spending percentiles from the 
MSSP would lower average ACO spending per beneficiary in our sample by 3.1% or 
0.6%, respectively (Table A6 in Appendix A). Conversely, average ACO spending per 
beneficiary would increase by 1.1% in our sample if we included clinicians that exited 
the MSSP in our sample and excluded those clinicians that entered (Table A7 in 
Appendix A). These changes are similar in magnitude to previous estimates of total 
savings in the MSSP.12,21–23,71 
 
Possible limitations of our analysis merit discussion. First, as with voluntary MSSP 
participation status, some unobserved factor may confound the relationship between 
MSSP supply and performance. Markets with greater MSSP supply likely contain more 
clinicians capable of implementing value-based initiatives. However, because our 
instrumental variable models used only within-market MSSP supply changes over time, 
the instrumental variable is not subject to this concern. Moreover, in contrast to the 
adjusted longitudinal model, MSSP supply displayed excellent covariate balance, 
parallel spending trends, and was not associated with changes in the falsification 
outcome. Second, instrumental variable models typically generate less precise 
estimates than those from adjusted models, risking type II error. However, instrumental 
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variable estimates of spending, quality, and hip fracture all differed significantly from 
adjusted longitudinal estimates.75 Third, it is possible that changes in hip fracture 
hospitalization, our falsification outcome, represent true improvements by ACOs to 
underlying beneficiary health. However, this is unlikely during our brief post-period and 
in light of ACOs’ relatively modest improvements to other health outcomes.12,21–23,58,71 
Fourth, because we attributed beneficiaries to MSSP ACOs using CMS’ official 
participant lists of MSSP beneficiaries and clinicians, our results may differ from initial 
MSSP evaluations that used their own attribution methodology 21–23,60. However, 
assessing whether MSSP ACOs strategically recruit or drop high-cost clinicians 
required that we use CMS’ official participants lists. 
 
Finally, because instrumental variable models estimate treatment effects among 
marginal clinicians, our findings may not generalize to clinicians who would either 
always join the MSSP (e.g., because they are employed by an early adopter health 
system) or never join the MSSP (e.g., because they lack the desire or capacity to 
undertake such a reform). At the same time, this population of clinicians — those joining 
the MSSP due to greater engagement with and access to other MSSP clinicians — is of 
intrinsic policy relevance. That the MSSP had little effect among these participants is 
directly relevant for assessing the potential economic and health rewards of 
governmental policies intended to promote ACO participation, such as the 2015 




Our results challenge the view that MSSP ACOs have lowered spending and improved 
quality, suggesting that improved performance by MSSP ACOs may be driven by 
clinicians’ non-random entry and exit to and from this voluntary program. These findings 
suggest caution in extending ACOs to other settings and patients without stronger 
evidence that the program saves money or improves quality of care. Our study 
underscores the degree to which selection bias may affect evaluations of voluntary 
reforms and the challenges inherent in evaluating these programs.
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Table I.1. Characteristics of beneficiaries and clinicians across Medicare Shared Savings 




















































  Age, y 76.8 75.4 -0.20 76.6 76.6 0.00 
  Female 60.2 60.9 0.01 60.3 60.4 0.00 
  
Race/Ethnicityd 
      
    Non-Hispanic 
white 
85.8 86.7 0.03 85.2 86.9 0.05 
    Non-Hispanic 
black 
6.9 6.2 -0.03 6.9 6.7 -0.01 
    Hispanic 4.1 3.7 -0.02 4.3 3.7 -0.03 
    Other 3.2 3.3 0.01 3.5 2.8 -0.04 




1.5 1.1 -0.12 1.4 1.4 -0.01 
  HCC Risk 
Scoref 
1.1 1.0 -0.22 1.1 1.1 0.01 
  Disabilityg 8.8 7.2 -0.06 8.5 8.6 0.01 
  End-stage 
renal diseaseh 
0.7 0.3 -0.06 0.7 0.7 0.00 
Area-level 
characteristics 
      
  Below federal 
poverty leveli 
14.0 12.4 -0.19 13.8 13.6 -0.03 
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  With high 
school degreei 
86.4 87.8 0.16 86.5 86.8 0.04 
  With college 
degreei 
28.0 31.2 0.19 28.6 28.3 -0.02 
  In Medicare 
Advantagej 
22.0 21.7 -0.03 21.9 22.0 0.00 
Patient 
outcomes 
      
  Total spending 
per beneficiary-
quarter ($) 
2,514 1,725 -0.12 2,381 2,414 0.00 




2.6 1.3 -0.03 2.4 2.4 0.00 
 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; HCC, Hierarchical Condition Category. 
a Descriptive characteristics were based on the pre-MSSP period (January 2008-March 2012) and were calculated for all 
beneficiaries appearing in at least one post-period quarter, as this was required for determining whether the attributed 
clinician was exposed to high vs. low MSSP supply (N= 56,669,720 beneficiary-quarters). 
b For descriptive analyses, MSSP participants were defined as beneficiaries who ever participated in the MSSP over the 
study period; controls were defined as beneficiaries who never participated in the MSSP over the study period. For 
regression analyses of the effect of the MSSP on study outcomes, MSSP participation was defined using a time-varying 
indicator that equaled 1 if the beneficiary was attributed to the MSSP in a given quarter, 0 otherwise. 
 
c High vs. low MSSP supply was defined by whether the attributed clinician’s median MSSP value was above (1=high) or 
equal to or below (0=low) the median MSSP supply value for the HRR over the entire post-period. The beginning of the 
post-period was designated as the first quarter in which the HRR contained at least one clinician participating in the 
MSSP. 
d Race/ethnicity was determined from Medicare enrollment files and based on the RTI race/ethnicity designation. 
e Dual-eligibility for Medicaid was defined by the number of months in the year that the beneficiary’s state of residence 
paid the monthly premium for Part B coverage (range: 0-12). 
f HCC risk scores were calculated using Medicare demographic and diagnostic data from the prior year’s enrollment and 
claims files. Higher HCC risk scores indicate higher predicted spending in the present year. 
g Disability was defined by original reason for Medicare entitlement, regardless of current disability status.  
h End-stage renal disease was defined by original reason for Medicare entitlement, regardless of current end-stage renal 
disease status. 
i The proportion living below federal poverty level, with a high school degree, and with a college degree was defined at the 
zip-code tabulation area using American Community Survey data. 
j The proportion of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage was defined at the county-level using enrollment data for 
a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries and was equal to 1 if the beneficiary was enrolled for ≥ 1 month during 
the year, 0 otherwise. 




Figure I.1. Changes in Medicare spending for beneficiaries attributed to MSSP ACOs vs. controls 
 
 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; ACO, accountable care organization CI, confidence interval. 
Mean outcomes for control beneficiaries were calculated as the intercept coefficient from adjusted longitudinal models with mean-centered 
covariates. Mean outcomes for MSSP beneficiaries were calculated as the sum of the control mean and the estimated effect of the MSSP on the 
outcome. Total spending was the sum of Medicare spending for inpatient, outpatient, professional service, and skill nursing facilities. Component 
spending was defined by claims for services from the following research identifiable files: Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (inpatient and 
skilled nursing facility services); Carrier (professional services); and Outpatient Services (outpatient services).  
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Figure I.2. Changes in spending and hospitalization for hip fracture across models for fixed differences across 
MSSP participants vs. controls 
 
Panel A. Change in rate of hospitalization for hip fracture per 1000 beneficiary-quarters 
 
Panel B. Changes in total spending per beneficiary-quarter 
 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
Mean outcomes for control beneficiaries were calculated as the intercept coefficient from adjusted longitudinal models with mean-centered 
covariates. Mean outcomes for MSSP beneficiaries were calculated as the sum of the control mean and the estimated effect of the MSSP on the 
outcome. Hospitalization for hip fracture was defined as a Medicare acute hospital claim for a primary diagnosis of hip fracture (820.xx). Total 
spending was the sum of Medicare spending for inpatient, outpatient, professional services, and skill nursing facilities.
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Figure I.3. Changes in clinical quality performance for beneficiaries attributed to MSSP ACOs vs. controls 
 
 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; ACO, accountable care organization; CI, confidence interval. 
The proportions of MSSP beneficiaries and controls receiving the preventive service are given in percent. Clinical quality indicators are defined in 
the Methods of Appendix A. Mean outcomes for control beneficiaries were calculated as the intercept coefficient from adjusted longitudinal models 
with mean-centered covariates. Mean outcomes for MSSP beneficiaries were calculated as the sum of control mean and the estimated effect of 
the MSSP on the outcome. Analyses of glycated hemoglobin testing, LDL cholesterol testing, and diabetic retinal examination were limited to 
beneficiaries with diabetes (N=6,779,900 beneficiary-quarters). Mammography analyses were limited to female beneficiaries with ages 65-69 
(N=11,926,849 beneficiary-quarters).
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Figure I.4. Association between clinician spending performance and probability of 
exiting or entering an MSSP ACO 
 
 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; ACO, accountable care organization. 
Prior spending performance was defined as each clinician’s average Medicare spending per beneficiary 
per year in the three years prior to MSSP exit or entry determination. The probability of a clinician 
entering or exiting the MSSP was estimated as a function of the clinician’s average spending, average 
beneficiary characteristics, market fixed effects, and year fixed effects. A quadratic spending term was 
included to allow for any potential non-linearities in the effect of spending performance on MSSP 
participation. Analyses of MSSP exit (Panel A; N = 21,970 clinician-years) were restricted to clinicians 
participating in the MSSP during the year prior to analysis. Analyses of MSSP entry (Panel B; N = 
162,336 clinician-years) were restricted to clinicians not participating in the MSSP during the year prior to 
analysis and did not include ACO formation, i.e., participation in an ACO’s first contract year. Both sets of 
analyses were restricted to ACOs entering MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013, as 2012-2014 MSSP data 
could not be used to determine clinician exit or entry for ACOs formed in 2014. 
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To encourage Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) to care for high-risk beneficiaries, savings benchmarks are 
adjusted by beneficiaries’ baseline risk scores. To discourage increased coding 
intensity, benchmarks are not adjusted upward if beneficiary risk score rises while in the 
MSSP. To evaluate the impact of this risk adjustment policy, we examined whether 
beneficiary exposure to the MSSP was associated with within-beneficiary changes in 
risk score and whether risk score was associated with beneficiary entry and exit in the 
MSSP. We found that the MSSP was not associated with consistent changes in within-
beneficiary risk score. Conversely, the highest-risk beneficiaries (99th percentile of risk 
score) had a 25.1% chance of exiting the MSSP compared to a 16.0% chance among 
median risk beneficiaries (50th percentile). CMS’ decision to not upwardly adjust risk 
score in the MSSP has successfully deterred coding increases but may have led ACOs 




Encouraging organizations to care for high-risk beneficiaries while holding them 
accountable for spending and health outcomes is a central tension of payment reform.30 
In the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs) are eligible to receive shared savings bonuses if they lower spending below a 
financial benchmark based on the historical spending of the beneficiaries attributed to 
the ACO. To avoid penalizing ACOs that care for high-risk beneficiaries (i.e., greater 
medical complexity and predicted spending), an ACO’s financial benchmark is adjusted 
using each beneficiary’s Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score. To minimize 
ACOs’ incentives to raise benchmarks by increased diagnostic coding, the benchmark 
is not adjusted upward if the risk score rises while the beneficiary is in the MSSP. 33–35 If 
the risk score falls, however, the benchmark is adjusted downward. 
 
It is unknown if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approach to risk 
adjustment has appropriately balanced incentives for ACOs to care for high-risk 
beneficiaries against not rewarding ACOs for increasing coding intensity in the MSSP. 
Because CMS’ approach does not capture growth in risk score over time, many 
commenters expressed concern during rulemaking that ACOs still have an incentive to 
avoid high-risk beneficiaries with increasing comorbidities or acute illness (i.e., 
“favorable selection”).33–35 For instance, ACOs may deliberately drop clinicians with 
high-risk beneficiary panels, excluding clinicians from the ACO Participant List 
submitted to CMS each year.25 ACOs may also prevent high-risk beneficiaries from 
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being attributed to their ACO. Although ACOs typically must provide care to 
beneficiaries with Medicare, ACOs could exploit the MSSP’s retrospective attribution 
methodology by: 1) submitting claims that cannot lead to attribution; 2) submitting 
claims from a provider ineligible for the MSSP (e.g., urologists) and thus excluded from 
attribution; or 3) billing under a provider group not included in the ACO Participant List. 
At the same time, because this risk adjustment system also penalizes ACOs that allow 
beneficiaries’ risk scores and benchmarks to fall, ACOs also face an incentive to remain 
vigilant in maintaining their current levels of coding intensity. 
 
To evaluate the impact of this risk adjustment policy, we used national Medicare data 
from 2008 through 2014 to examine the relationship between the MSSP and beneficiary 
risk profiles. We assessed changes in coding intensity by evaluating whether 
beneficiary exposure to the MSSP was associated with within-beneficiary changes in 
risk score over time. We assessed favorable selection by evaluating whether beneficiary 
risk score and risk growth was associated with entry and exit of beneficiaries and 




Data Sources and Study Population. We used national claims data from 2008 
through 2014 for a random 20 percent sample of beneficiaries in Fee-for-Service (FFS) 
Medicare. This included the following Research Identifiable Files: Medicare Provider 
Analysis and Review (inpatient and skilled nursing facility services); Carrier (physician 
 37 
services); Outpatient (facility services); and Master Beneficiary Summary File 
(beneficiary enrollment and sociodemographic information). To ensure accurate 
designation of MSSP participation, we used CMS’ Provider- and Beneficiary-level 
Shared Savings Program files to attribute beneficiaries and clinicians to MSSP ACOs 
(2012-2014). We then linked ACOs to Leavitt Partners ACO Database and CMS’ 
Shared Savings Program Public-Use File to obtain data on ACOs’ organizational 
characteristics and performance in the MSSP. 
 
We constructed a cohort of Medicare beneficiaries who were continuously enrolled in 
FFS Medicare to examine longitudinal relationships between the MSSP beneficiary risk 
profiles. Following MSSP specifications, we excluded beneficiaries who were enrolled in 
Medicare Advantage or not enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B.57 In order to ensure 
consistent identification of within-beneficiary risk score changes over time, we also 
excluded beneficiaries who died or had missing risk scores in any year of the study 
(2008-2014). This also ensured that MSSP exit was not an artifact of beneficiary death. 
To improve comparability between MSSP beneficiaries and controls, we also excluded 
beneficiaries who resided outside of a hospital referral region or lacked any eligible 
primary care claims required for MSSP attribution in any year of the study (CONSORT 
diagram, Figure B1 in Appendix B). 
 
Measures. CMS derives a single HCC risk score for each Medicare beneficiary to 
predict spending in the subsequent year.76 This algorithm is a prospective model that 
incorporates both diagnostic information in claims data (subsequently classified into 
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HCCs) and demographic information (including age, sex, Medicaid dual eligibility, and 
disability). For the purpose of risk adjustment, CMS calculates the HCC risk score 
based on patient and clinical factors in the prior year. In this study, we calculate the 
HCC risk score based on patient and clinical factors in the concurrent year. 
 
We defined exposure to the MSSP using a time-varying indicator for cumulative time 
attributed to an MSSP ACO. This captured ACOs’ staggered entry into MSSP contracts 
(April 2012, July 2012, January 2013, January 2014) and the ability of beneficiaries to 
enter and exit MSSP ACOs each year. 
 
We used the Master Beneficiary Summary File to define beneficiary age, sex, 
race/ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, or other/unknown), original reason for Medicare 
entitlement (aged, disability, end-stage renal disease), dual-eligibility for Medicaid 
(months of enrollment), and average county-level Medicare Advantage penetration 
(share of Medicare beneficiaries). Due to consistent reports that risk scores have 
increased more among beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage than in FFS Medicare,77–80 
adjusting for Medicare Advantage penetration addressed potential confounding between 
risk score and local changes in MSSP and Medicare Advantage penetration. We used 
American Community Survey data to define beneficiary area-level poverty (proportion 
below federal poverty level) and education (proportion graduated from high school, 
college). We used the Shared Savings Program Public Use File to define MSSP earned 
shared savings (yes/no) and the Leavitt database to define ACO organizational 
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structure (physician-led, hospital-led, or physician-hospital partnership) and concurrent 
entry in a commercial ACO contract (yes/no). 
 
Analyses. We first examined the relationship between the MSSP and changes in coded 
risk score. We performed a longitudinal, beneficiary-level analysis of the effect of MSSP 
exposure on within-beneficiary changes in risk score over time. We estimated linear 
regression models that included a time-varying indicator of cumulative MSSP exposure, 
beneficiary fixed effects, year fixed effects (to control for secular trends), and the time-
varying characteristics. By using beneficiaries as their own controls, these models 
controlled for fixed unobserved differences across beneficiaries that may confound the 
relationship between MSSP exposure and risk score. We performed two sensitivity 
analyses of the relationship between MSSP exposure and coded risk. First, to better 
isolate the influence of coding on risk score, we also estimated changes in the 
component of the risk score most plausibly affected by coding practice (i.e., the count of 
Condition Categories that originate from provider-reported diagnoses) and excluded the 
components originating from administrative data (e.g., age, sex, disability status). 
Second, because ACOs also have an incentive to lower spending in the MSSP, we also 
evaluated changes in risk scores normalized by total price-standardized spending. 
 
We next assessed whether MSSP ACOs engage in favorable selection, e.g., avoiding 
high-risk beneficiaries or clinicians with high-risk patient panels. First, we examined the 
relationship between beneficiary risk score and subsequent entry or exit of the 
beneficiary to or from the MSSP. In these analyses, we estimated the probability of 
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beneficiary entry and exit as a function of prior-year risk score, market fixed effects 
(defined by hospital referral region), year fixed effects, beneficiary age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, disability, end-stage renal disease, dual-eligibility for Medicaid, and area-
level poverty, education, and Medicare Advantage penetration. Robustness tests 
included assessing entry and exit: 1) using beneficiary average risk score in the prior 
two or three years; 2) among only those beneficiaries attributed to MSSP ACOs vs. 
controls using only eligible claims submitted by primary care clinicians (vs. specialists) 
in the outpatient setting (vs. post-acute care facilities); and 3) across ACO and 
beneficiary characteristics. In sensitivity analyses exploring the mechanisms for entry 
and exit, we estimated models of clinician entry or exit from the MSSP as a function of 
the clinician’s patient panel’s average risk score, other patient characteristics (listed 
above), year fixed effects, and market fixed effects (see Methods in Appendix B). 
 
Finally, we investigated the impact of CMS’ decision to not upwardly adjust spending 
benchmarks by examining whether growth in risk scores varied across MSSP status. 
We compared growth in risk score across beneficiaries who were never in the MSSP, 
always in the MSSP (through 2014), entered the MSSP (in 2014), or exited the MSSP 
(in 2014). This classification scheme followed a recent report by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission.81 Differences in risk score growth were examined using a linear 
spline model that included MSSP status (always, never, enter, or exit), splines for the 
two periods when entry and exit could either not occur (2012-2013) or could occur 
(2013-2014), and an interaction between MSSP status and the two splines. Models also 
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included market fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the time-varying beneficiary 
characteristics described above. 
 
All analyses specified robust standard errors to account for clustering at the market 
level. Statistical analyses were performed using Stata version 15.1. Our study using 
administrative data was deemed exempt from review by the University of Michigan 
Institutional Review Board. 
 
Limitations. Our study has several limitations. First, administrative data cannot be used 
to determine whether risk score changes reflect true changes to health status, health 
care utilization, or coding practices. It is possible that ACOs have both improved health 
and lowered utilization (lowering risk score) and increased coding intensity (raising risk 
score), with uncertain net effects on average risk score. Nonetheless, results were 
comparable using risk scores normalized by price-standardized spending (Figure B2 in 
Appendix B). Second, it is difficult to determine whether MSSP exit reflects passive 
“leakage” of high-risk beneficiaries to non-ACO specialists or strategic behavior by 
ACOs intending to drop clinicians who care for high-risk beneficiaries. However, passive 
leakage to non-ACO specialists is unlikely to explain our finding that beneficiary risk 
was disproportionately associated with exit among beneficiaries attributed via outpatient 
claims submitted by primary care clinicians (Figure B2 in Appendix B), nor would it 
explain our finding that exit of clinicians with high-risk panels partially drove this exit 
(Figure B3 in Appendix B). 
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Third, although our analysis of risk score changes controlled for fixed differences across 
MSSP beneficiaries and controls, time-varying confounding is a threat. For instance, 
ACOs dropping high-risk beneficiaries would create a negative association between 
beneficiary risk score and MSSP exposure (e.g., reverse causality), inducing a 
downward bias and underestimation of the true effect of MSSP exposure on risk score. 
Our use of cumulative (vs. current) MSSP exposure minimizes but may not eliminate 
this bias. Fourth, historical data ending in 2014 may not generalize to today’s ACOs. It 
is possible that the relationship between beneficiary risk profiles and MSSP ACOs have 
changed in the intervening years. Our results may also not generalize to younger 





Beneficiary MSSP attribution and risk profiles. FFS Medicare beneficiaries in our 
sample contributed 13,864,627 beneficiary-years from 2008 through 2014 (n=1,980,661 
beneficiaries). By the end of 2014, 21.4% of beneficiaries (n=425,353) had been 
attributed at some point to the MSSP, with MSSP beneficiaries exposed to the program 
for an average of 1.65 years (range: 1 to 2.75 years). 
 
Unadjusted differences in beneficiaries’ clinical and sociodemographic baseline 
characteristics between MSSP beneficiaries and controls were typically small, though 
MSSP beneficiaries resided in areas with higher education and lower poverty (Table 
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II.1). The average risk score in the pre-period (2008-2011) was 1.06 (standard 
deviation, 0.81). Pre-period trends in adjusted risk score were similar across MSSP 
beneficiaries and controls (Figures B5 and B6 in Appendix B). Because we required 
enrollment in FFS Medicare for each year of the study, beneficiaries in our sample were 
more likely to have become entitled to Medicare due to old age (vs. ESRD or disability) 
and were thus older, on average, than excluded beneficiaries (Table B1 in Appendix B). 
 
Change in within-beneficiary risk score. The MSSP was not associated with change 
in average risk score in the pooled analysis (percent change in risk score, 0.0%, 95% 
confidence interval [CI], -0.3% to 0.3%) (Figure II.1). However, this relationship varied 
significantly across MSSP cohorts. The MSSP was not associated with risk score 
change among beneficiaries entering the MSSP in 2012 (change, -0.2%, 95% CI, -0.6% 
to 0.2%) or 2013 (change, 0.1%, 95% CI, -0.3% to 0.5%) but was associated with a 
1.1% increase in risk score (95% CI, 0.4% to 1.7%) among beneficiaries entering the 
MSSP in 2014. The relationship between the MSSP and risk score did not vary across 
whether the ACO earned shared savings in the MSSP, whether the ACO held a 
concurrent commercial ACO contract, or the ACOs’ organizational structure. We 
observed variation in risk score according to Medicare Advantage penetration, with the 
MSSP associated with a 0.6% increase in risk score (95% CI, 0.1% to 1.1%) among 
beneficiaries residing in areas with high penetration by Medicare Advantage plans vs. 
those that did not (change, -0.1%, 95% CI, -0.4% to 0.2%).  
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Overall, we observed a similar pattern of results in sensitivity analyses which used the 
count of Condition Categories and risk scores normalized by price-adjusted spending as 
the study outcomes (Figure B3 in Appendix B). 
 
Beneficiary exit and entry in the MSSP. Beneficiary exit and entry in the MSSP was 
common (Table II.1). Of the 245,239 beneficiaries initially attributed to ACOs in 2012 or 
2013, 40,428 (16.4%) exited the MSSP in 2014. Of the 278,672 beneficiaries attributed 
to ACOs in 2014, 72,861 (26.1%) entered the MSSP in 2014. 
 
Figure II.2 shows the relationship between beneficiary risk score and exit or entry from 
the program. Beneficiaries at the 95th and 99th percentile of risk score in the prior year 
had a 21.6% and 25.0% chance of exiting an MSSP ACO in the subsequent year, as 
compared to a 16.0% chance among beneficiaries at the median (50th percentile) risk 
score (risk difference, 5.7 percentage point [p.p.] and 9.1 p.p., respectively, both 
P<.001; Table B2 in Appendix B). Entry into already-formed ACOs was also modestly 
higher among beneficiaries in the 99th percentile of risk score as compared to the 
beneficiaries at the median (risk difference, 1.0 p.p., P<.001; Figure II.2 and Table B2).  
The disproportionate exit by high-risk beneficiaries from the MSSP was consistent 
across a range of subgroups and when using beneficiaries’ average risk score in the 
prior two or three years (Figures B7 and B8 in Appendix B), suggesting that exit was 
specifically associated with beneficiary health status vs. other beneficiary or provider 
characteristics. We observed a similar pattern of MSSP exit and entry among 
beneficiaries attributed via outpatient claims submitted by primary care clinicians 
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(Figures B3 in Appendix B), suggesting that exit was not driven by passive leakage of 
high-risk beneficiaries to non-ACO specialists. 
 
Clinician exit appeared to drive exit of high-risk beneficiaries from the program (Figure 
B3 in Appendix B). Clinicians at the 95th and 99th percentile of average panel risk score 
had a 20.6% and 26.3% chance of exiting an MSSP ACO, as compared to a 16.0% 
chance among clinicians at the median panel risk score (risk difference, 4.5 p.p. and 
10.3 p.p., respectively, both P<.001). 
 
Change in MSSP risk profile composition. Figure II.3 demonstrates risk score growth 
among beneficiaries who were always in the MSSP (through 2014), never in the MSSP, 
entered the MSSP (in 2014), or exited the MSSP (in 2014). Among the four groups, 
beneficiaries who ultimately exited the MSSP demonstrated the highest risk score 
growth in the periods prior to exit (2012-2013) and following exit (2013-2014). 
Compared to beneficiaries who were always in the MSSP, beneficiaries who exited the 
program had risk score growth that was 4.8 p.p. higher prior to exit (95% CI, 3.8 to 5.9) 
and 3.1 p.p. higher following exit (95% CI, 1.9 to 4.3; Table B3 in Appendix B). 
Beneficiaries who entered the MSSP also demonstrated risk score growth that was 2.2 
p.p. higher prior to entry (95% CI, 1.6 to 2.8) and 1.6 p.p. higher following entry (95% 
CI, 0.7 to 2.4), as compared to beneficiaries always in the MSSP. When directly 
comparing exiting vs. entering beneficiaries, those who exited the MSSP had risk score 
growth that 2.7 p.p. (95% CI, 1.5 to 3.9) in 2012-2013 and 1.6 p.p. higher (95% CI, 0.0 
to 3.1) in 2013-2014. These risk growth differences between beneficiaries exiting and 
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entering the MSSP are large, representing a 71% increase relative to overall risk score 
growth in 2012-2013 (~ difference of 2.7 p.p. / 3.7 p.p. overall risk score growth in the 




In this national cohort study of Medicare beneficiaries, we found limited evidence that 
exposure to the MSSP increased within-beneficiary risk score. At the same time, we 
found that high-risk beneficiaries and clinicians with higher-risk patient panels were 
disproportionately likely to exit MSSP ACOs. MSSP exit was particularly concentrated 
among beneficiaries with increased risk score growth in the MSSP and following exit 
from the program. These findings suggest that the current system of risk adjustment in 
the MSSP has successfully deterred coding increases but may not adequately 
encourage ACOs to care for high-risk beneficiaries in the MSSP. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of within-beneficiary changes 
in coded risk in the MSSP. Much more attention has been paid to coded risk in 
Medicare Advantage, where use of HCC risk scores to adjust capitated payments has 
been associated with substantial increases in coded risk and billions of taxpayer dollars 
in potential overpayment to Medicare Advantage plans.77–80 There is also precedent in 
FFS Medicare, where CMS efforts to link global payment reform with appropriate risk 
adjustment have been associated with increased diagnostic coding following Medicare’s 
introduction of the Inpatient Prospective Payment System, Hospital Readmissions 
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Reduction Program, and Physician Group Practice demonstration, an early model for 
ACOs.15,31,32 
 
Several features of the MSSP may have contributed to the lack of an observed change 
in coded risk. Risk coding in the MSSP may be less susceptible to coding practices. 
ACOs cannot submit supplemental diagnostic codes, while Medicare Advantage plans 
conduct health risk assessments in enrollee’s homes and perform retrospective reviews 
of medical charts.79 Retrospective attribution of beneficiaries to MSSP ACOs may 
hamper organizational efforts to target coding efforts (vs. prospective Medicare 
Advantage attribution or clearly defined hospital episodes).35 The high rates of 
beneficiary exit and entry we uncovered in the MSSP may also impede efforts to 
systematically intensify coding across a static beneficiary population. 
 
MSSP ACOs may also face weakened incentives to intensify coding. Discouraging 
coding intensification is the explicit motivation underlying CMS’ decision to not upwardly 
adjust risk scores of beneficiaries remaining in MSSP ACOs.33–35 Meanwhile, the spread 
of risk-based contracts through public and private insurance has raised the salience of 
coding for all providers,30 perhaps reducing the marginal incentive to increase coding for 
MSSP beneficiaries relative to those in standard FFS Medicare. Our finding that coded 
risk increased among MSSP beneficiaries residing in areas with high Medicare 
Advantage penetration suggests that MSSP incentives to increase coding may depend 
on organizations’ coding expertise and ability to spread fixed costs of coding initiatives. 
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ACOs and other stakeholders expressed concern during final rulemaking that CMS’ 
failure to upwardly adjust beneficiary risk may cause ACOs to avoid high-risk 
beneficiaries in the MSSP. 33–35 However, ours is the first study to empirically evaluate 
this question. We found that high-risk beneficiaries and clinicians with high-risk patient 
panels were more likely to exit the MSSP. Our results are consistent with a recent study 
by Hsu and colleagues, who found that clinicians with high-risk patient panels were 
more likely to exit Partners HealthCare Pioneer ACO.25  
 
There are several reasons why chronically- or acutely-ill beneficiaries may 
disproportionately exit MSSP ACOs. First, MSSP beneficiaries with complex needs may 
receive care from specialists outside the ACO, causing them be passively attributed 
(“leakage”) to non-MSSP organizations the following year. However, this is unlikely 
given MSSP’s attribution methodology, which only incorporates specialist claims when 
there are no eligible claims from primary care clinicians. Moreover, our finding that 
beneficiary risk was associated with MSSP exit among beneficiaries attributed via 
outpatient claims from primary care clinicians (Figure B3 in Appendix B) and among 
both hospital- and physician-led ACOs (Figure B7 in Appendix B) suggests that exit by 
high-risk beneficiaries was unrelated to ACOs’ ability to provide specialty care. 
 
An alternative explanation is that ACOs are strategically dropping high-risk beneficiaries 
or clinicians with high-risk patient panels to decrease measured spending and increase 
the likelihood of earning shared savings. MSSP ACOs’ ability to contract with clinicians 
each year may enable ACOs to drop clinicians with higher-risk patient panels.25,33–35 
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ACOs may also prevent high-risk beneficiaries from being attributed to their ACO, 
exploiting the MSSP’s retrospective attribution methodology by either submitting claims 
not included in MSSP attribution rules (because the claims are ineligible or because the 
claims are submitted by an ineligible provider) or by billing under a provider group not 
included in its ACO Participant List (e.g., skilled nursing facility). Because the MSSP 
does not upwardly adjust risk scores following MSSP attribution, beneficiaries with 
worsening health status are particularly detrimental to ACOs’ savings benchmarks. Our 
finding that risk score growth was highest among exiting beneficiaries (both prior to and 
following exit) raises this possibility. Regardless of the mechanism, exit from the MSSP 
threatens policy efforts to improve the efficiency and quality of care for high-risk 
beneficiaries. 
 
Policy Implications. The tension between appropriate risk adjustment and 
inappropriate coding practices, already evident during early MSSP rulemaking, will 
increase rapidly as the MSSP transitions to regional benchmarks and two-sided risk 
contracts. In its 2016 Final Rule, CMS announced that it will continue to not upwardly 
adjust risk scores even as it implements regional benchmarks incorporating average 
spending of nearby providers with potentially very different patient compositions.35 
 
There are several ways CMS could reduce MSSP incentives and ACOs’ ability to avoid 
beneficiaries with chronic or acute illness. The most obvious solution is to upwardly 
adjust risk score. This successfully reduced favorable selection in Medicare 
Advantage51 but also considerably intensified risk coding.77–80 A second approach is 
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allowing for upward risk adjustment while capping risk score changes at plus or minus 
three percent, as in the Next Generation ACO model. However, this may not alter 
selection incentives if and when the majority of ACOs reach this threshold. A third 
approach is incorporating other sociodemographic factors that predict spending but are 
less subject to coding practices, e.g., race, education, area-level poverty.52,82,83 
However, our study suggests that MSSP exit is more frequent among acutely-ill 
beneficiaries whose changing health status may not be captured by stable 
sociodemographic characteristics. To encourage ACOs to care for these beneficiaries, 
the MSSP could adjust for pre-existing “risk velocities” (e.g., growth in patient risk score) 
in the years prior to MSSP attribution. 
 
CMS could couple efforts to enhance risk adjustment with aggressive auditing of 
compositional change and coding practices in the MSSP. Although CMS has repeatedly 
stated in each MSSP Final Rule that it plans to do this,33–35 whether or how this has 
occurred remains unknown. The limits of auditing are demonstrated by the Medicare 
Advantage experience, where the focus has been on detecting outright fraud rather than 
on whether the transfer of taxpayer funds to Medicare Advantage plans appropriately 
reflects true differences in health across beneficiaries.77 Finally, CMS could make it 
more difficult for ACOs to drop high-risk beneficiaries. Prospective attribution – used in 
the Next Generation and MSSP Track 3 models – may help prevent ACOs from 
dropping beneficiaries during the performance year and prior to attribution. 
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Conclusion. This study contributes important evidence to ongoing discussions about 
the role of risk adjustment in alternative payment models. Our results suggest that the 
current risk adjustment system has successfully deterred coding increases but may not 
adequately encourage ACOs to care for high-risk beneficiaries in the MSSP. Even with 
significant reform, it may not be possible to achieve a perfect balance between 
adequate risk adjustment and favorable selection in the MSSP. As the MSSP and other 
Medicare ACOs expand, it will be important to monitor the evolution of ACO risk profiles 
and to weigh the dual policy goals of preventing coding increases against caring for 
high-risk beneficiaries in the program. 
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Table II.1. Characteristics of beneficiaries in Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP) Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) vs. controls in 2011 
 
 
Covariate balance across 
all MSSP beneficiaries vs. 
controlsa 
Covariate balance across 




























Age, y (SD) 74.2 (10.5) 74.6 (10.2) 74.7 (9.9) 74.5 (10.6) 74.4 (11.1) 
Female 60.7%  60.8%  60.7%  61.2%  61.2%  
Race/Ethnicityc      
Non-Hispanic 
white 86.1%  86.4%  87.4%  86.4%  86.2%  
Non-Hispanic 
black  7.2%   6.9%   6.3%   6.4%   7.1%  
Hispanic  3.7%   3.7%   3.2%   4.2%   4.1%  




year)d 1.8 (4.3) 1.6 (4.1) 1.6 (4.0) 1.7 (4.2) 1.8 (4.3) 
Disabilitye 20.2%  18.1%  17.4%  19.2%  20.2%  
End-stage renal 
disease f  0.4%   0.4%   0.4%   0.6%   0.5%  
Area-level 
characteristics      
Medicare 
Advantageg 22.3 (12.7) 22.5 (12.1) 22.8 (11.9) 21.8 (12.7) 22.3 (11.2) 
Below federal 
poverty levelh 14.0 (8.5) 12.6 (8.3) 12.5 (8.2) 12.6 (8.3) 12.5 (8.3) 
With high school 
degreeh 27.7 (15.8) 30.6 (16.1) 30.4 (15.8) 30.8 (16.5) 30.9 (16.2) 
With college 
degreeh 86.3 (8.5) 87.5 (8.2) 87.7 (8.1) 87.6 (8.3) 87.6 (8.2) 
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Beneficiary 
outcomes      



















a MSSP beneficiaries were defined as beneficiaries who were ever attributed to the 
MSSP between 2012 and 2014. Controls were defined as beneficiaries who were never 
attributed to the MSSP between 2012 and 2014. 
b Comparisons of beneficiaries who were always in the MSSP (through 2014), entered 
the MSSP (in 2014) or exited the MSSP (in 2014) were restricted to ACOs that entered 
MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013. We excluded beneficiaries who formed ACOs that 
entered MSSP contracts in 2014, as we could not observe subsequent exit or entry in 
ACOs formed in 2014 using 2008-2014 data. 
c Race/ethnicity was determined from Medicare enrollment files and based on the RTI 
race/ethnicity designation. 
d Dual-eligibility for Medicaid was defined by the number of months in the year that the 
beneficiary’s state of residence paid the monthly premium for Part B coverage (range: 
0-12). 
e Disability was defined by original reason for Medicare entitlement, regardless of 
current disability status.  
f End-stage renal disease was defined by original reason for Medicare entitlement, 
regardless of current end-stage renal disease status. 
g The proportion of beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage was defined at the 
county-level using enrollment data for a 20% random sample of Medicare beneficiaries 
and was equal to 1 if the beneficiary was enrolled for ≥ 1 month during the year, 0 
otherwise. 
h The proportion living below federal poverty level, with a high school degree, and with a 
college degree was defined at the zip-code tabulation area using American Community 
Survey data. 
i HCC risk scores were calculated using Medicare demographic and diagnostic data 
from the prior year’s enrollment and claims files. Higher HCC risk scores indicate higher 
predicted spending in the present year. 
j Total annual spending was the sum of spending for inpatient, outpatient, professional, 
and skilled nursing facility services and was price-standardized to account for variation 
resulting from regional wage indices and payments for indirect medical education, 
Disproportionate Share Hospitals, and new technologies. 
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These models used risk score values derived from claims in the same year to capture the relationship between MSSP 
exposure and contemporaneous changes in risk score. Models included time-varying area-level factors (poverty, 
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education, Medicare Advantage penetration) and omitted time-varying demographic variables factors into the risk score 
algorithm (age, sex, Medicaid dual eligibility, disability) to avoid over-adjustment. We measured change in risk scores 
relative to the base category in the following manner: 1) estimated an interaction model that included an interaction term 
between the MSSP indicator and the ACO or beneficiary characteristic to the base regression model (explained in the 
text); 2) estimated risk score changes for each group; 3) formally tested for differential risk score changes across groups. 
MSSP cohort was defined as the year in which the beneficiary was first attributed to an MSSP ACO. High Medicare 
Advantage penetration was defined as residing in a county > 80th percentile for the share of fee-for-service beneficiaries 
enrolled in Medicare Advantage. Percent change in HCC risk score was measured as the estimated change in risk score 
relative to the average adjust risk score for MSSP beneficiaries in 2011 (prior to the program’s start). The error bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. ACO is accountable care organization. 




Figure II.2. Association between risk score and change in probability of 
beneficiary entering or exiting the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
 
 
Analyses of MSSP entry were restricted to beneficiaries not attributed to the MSSP in 
the year prior to analysis and specifically excluded beneficiaries who formed ACOs (i.e., 
entering in the ACO’s first contract year). Analyses of MSSP exit were restricted to 
beneficiaries attributed to the MSSP in the year prior to analysis. Both sets of analyses 
excluded beneficiaries who formed ACOs that entered MSSP contracts in 2014, as we 
could not observe subsequent exit or entry in ACOs formed in 2014 using 2008-2014 
data. The probability of entering or exiting was estimated as a linear function of risk 
score in the prior year, market fixed effects, year fixed effects, time-varying beneficiary 
characteristics, and a quadratic risk score term (to allow for potential non-linearities). To 
assess model fit, we also graphed beneficiaries’ adjusted probability of entry or exit 





Figure II.3. Growth in risk score and beneficiary entry and exit to and from the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program from 2012-2014 
 
 
Comparisons of beneficiaries who were always in the MSSP (through 2014), entered 
the MSSP (in 2014) or exited the MSSP (in 2014) were restricted to ACOs that entered 
MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013. We excluded beneficiaries who formed ACOs that 
entered MSSP contracts in 2014, as we could not observe subsequent exit or entry in 
ACOs formed in 2014 using 2008-2014 data. Differences in risk score growth were 
examined using a linear spline model that included market fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, the previously described beneficiary characteristics, beneficiary MSSP status 
(always vs. never vs. enter vs. exit), splines for the years 2012-2013 (when no entry or 
exit occurred) and 2013-2014 (when entry or exit could occur), and an interaction 
between MSSP status and the two splines. We then tested for differences in risk score 
growth estimated from this fully-interacted spline model
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Chapter III. Low-value care and clinician engagement in the Medicare Shared 




Background: Although the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) created 
organizational incentives to improve healthcare value, Accountable Care Organizations 
(ACOs) have achieved only modest reductions in the use of low-value care. It is 
unknown whether this reflects limited engagement of frontline clinicians charged with 
implementing ACO objectives. 
 
Objective: To assess ACO engagement of clinicians and whether engagement was 
associated with clinicians’ reported difficulty implementing recommendations against 
low-value care. 
 
Design: Cross-sectional survey of clinicians in an MSSP ACO between February 2018 
and August 2018.
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Participants: 1,289 clinicians in the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO, including 
physician specialists (27%), primary care physicians (18%), advanced practice nurses 
(18%), internal medicine specialists (16%), physician assistants (11%), and surgeons 
(10%). Response rate was 34%. 
 
Main Measures: Primary exposures included clinicians’ participation in ACO decision-
making, awareness of ACO incentives, perceived influence on practice, and perceived 
effect on quality improvement. Our primary outcome was clinicians’ reported difficulty 
implementing recommendations against low-value care. 
 
Results: Few clinicians participated in the decision to join the ACO (3%). Few clinicians 
were aware of ACO incentives, including knowing that the ACO was accountable for 
both spending and quality (23%), successfully lowered spending (9%), or faced upside 
risk only (3%). Few agreed (moderately or strongly) that the ACO changed 
compensation (20%), overall practice (19%), or feedback (15%) or that it improved care 
coordination (17%), inappropriate care (13%), or unnecessary hospitalizations (12%). 
Clinicians reported difficulty following recommendations against low-value care 18% of 
the time; clinicians reported patients had difficulty accepting recommendations 37% of 
the time. Increased ACO awareness (one standard deviation [SD]) was associated with 
decreased difficulty (-2.3 percentage point [pp]) implementing recommendations (95% 
confidence interval [CI]: -3.8, -0.8), as was perceived effect on quality improvement 
(change in 1 SD, -1.9 p.p., 95% CI, -3.2, -0.5). Participation in ACO decision-making 
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and perceived influence on practice were not associated with reported implementation 
of recommendations. 
 
Conclusions: Clinicians participating in ACOs were broadly unaware of and unengaged 
with ACO objectives and activities. Limited engagement of ACO clinicians may hamper 




Encouraging clinicians to decrease inappropriate or low-value care is a central goal of 
payment reform. In the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs) assume responsibility for the spending and quality outcomes of a 
defined group of patients. Despite the potential of shared savings, Medicare ACOs have 
achieved only modest improvements to spending and quality.11,84 It is unclear what has 
hampered ACO success. One potential source is limited organizational engagement of 
frontline clinicians charged with implementing ACO objectives. Since the inception of 
the ACO model, many policymakers have commented on the importance of fostering 
clinician awareness of ACO goals7,43 and payment structures that align clinicians’ and 
organizations’ incentives and norms.9,38–42 Others have questioned whether exposing 
clinicians to financial incentives is necessary or desirable, with some practice leaders 
using non-financial incentives (e.g., performance feedback) or forgoing savings 
incentives altogether (e.g., retaining productivity-based bonuses).9,19,36,37,44   
 
The perspective of individual clinicians has been largely absent from these policy 
conversations. Research has relied largely on data gathered from executive surveys 
and interviews.10,20,45–48 One national survey has focused on primary care physicians 
(PCPs) and internal medicine specialists during the early ACO experience (2014-2015), 
finding that Medicare ACOs had limited success engaging physicians in decision-
making, awareness of ACO incentives, or changing care delivery.48 There are no data 
on MSSP ACO engagement of other physician specialists (e.g., surgeons, 
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anesthesiologists, dermatologists) or advanced practice providers (e.g., nurse 
practitioners), despite their substantial contribution to total spending85 and the fact that 
MSSP ACOs are held responsible for the cost and quality performance of all 
participating clinicians. It is also unknown whether ACO engagement of individual 
clinicians is necessary to improve ACO spending and quality performance. 
 
In this study, we asked two research questions: 1) Have ACOs successfully engaged 
frontline clinicians?; and 2) Is ACO engagement of frontline clinicians associated 
clinicians’ reported ability to implement recommendations against low-value care? We 
designed and administered a survey of individual clinicians in the Physician 
Organization of Michigan (POM) ACO, the largest MSSP ACO in Michigan and among 
the ten largest in the county.49 We hypothesized that clinicians would report limited ACO 
engagement but that ACO engagement would be positively associated with clinicians’ 




Study Design. We conducted a cross-sectional survey between February and July 
2018. Our survey assessed four dimensions of ACO engagement of clinicians: 1) 
involvement in the decision to join ACO; 2) awareness of ACO incentives and initiatives; 
3) perceived influence of the ACO on practice; and 4) perceived effect of the ACO on 
quality improvement. Our survey also assessed clinicians’ reported ability to follow 
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recommendations against low-value care. This study was deemed exempt from review 
by the University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional 
Review Board. 
 
Setting and participants. The POM ACO is the largest MSSP ACO in Michigan and 
among the ten largest in the county,49 comprising 5,128 clinicians and approximately 
80,000 attributed beneficiaries. The POM ACO includes ten clinician organizations: 
Michigan Medicine; Integrated Health Associates; Huron Valley Physicians Association; 
MidMichigan Health; St Mary's of Michigan; Answer Health; Wexford-Crawford PHO; 
Oakland Southfield Physician; Oakland Southfield Physician; and Olympia Medical 
Services (Table III.1). The survey’s target population included all clinicians listed as 
participants in the POM ACO administrative roster. This includes physicians, physician 
assistants, advanced practice nurses (nurse practitioners, certified nurse anesthetists, 
certified nurse midwives), and other clinicians (clinical social workers, psychologists, 
audiologists, podiatrists, optometrists, chiropractors, and physical therapists). 
 
Survey development. We selected survey domains from existing literature and based 
on four semi-structured interviews with ACO leaders. We then created or adapted 
instruments that mapped to those domains. The instrument was refined based on two 
cognitive interviews and pretests with a purposive sample of ten clinicians representing 
diverse specialties (e.g., urologists, NPs, PCPs, interventional cardiologists). The 
survey domains, instruments, and adapted instrument sources20,48,86–91 are described in 
the Supplemental Methods and Table C1 in Appendix C. 
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Exposures. Our main exposures encompassed the following four dimensions of ACO 
engagement (Table III.2, Tables C2-C4 in Appendix C). First, we asked respondents to 
indicate their level of involvement in the decision to participate in the ACO (involved in 
the decision-making process, not involved but aware, not involved or aware). Second, 
we assessed respondents’ awareness of ACO incentives and initiatives, such as 
whether ACO was held accountable for both spending and quality. Third, we assessed 
respondents’ perception of the ACOs’ influence on their practice, for example whether 
joining an ACO had changed how the respondent practices medicine. Fourth, we 
assessed respondents’ perception of ACOs’ effect on quality improvement, for example 
whether joining an ACO had had a positive impact on care coordination. 
 
Outcome. Our main outcome was clinician’s reported difficulty implementing 
recommendations against low-value care. We presented respondents with four 
recommendations drawn from the Choosing Wisely® campaign.92 All respondents were 
presented with the following recommendation, “Don’t recommend cancer screening in 
adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years.” The other three recommendations 
based on the respondent’s specialty (Table III.3, Table C5 in Appendix C).92 We asked 
two questions for each recommendation: “Do you find this recommendation easy or 
difficult to follow most of the time?” (easy to follow, difficult to follow, does not apply to 
my practice); and “Do most patients find this recommendation easy or difficult to 
accept?” (easy to accept, difficult to accept, does not apply to my practice). 
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Survey administration. We administered the pilot (n=100) and full (n=5,028) survey in 
February and May 2018, respectively, including responses from each survey in the 
cohort of eligible respondents. We mailed survey invitations to clinicians’ practice 
addresses containing the survey description, a token $2 incentive, a stylish coaster, a 
unique access code, and a link to the online survey (hosted by Qualtrics).93 Non-
respondents received up to three additional follow-up reminders at 1, 2, and 5 weeks by 
email if possible (74% of roster) or postcard. 
 
Analysis. We estimated linear probability fixed-effects models to assess the 
relationship between ACO engagement and the probability of a clinician reporting 
difficulty implementing a given recommendation against low-value care. Our analysis 
was conducted at the clinician-recommendation-response level. For each dimension of 
ACO engagement (e.g., the ACO Awareness Scale), we estimated three models.  
 
First, we estimated an unadjusted model that did not account for clinician or 
organizational characteristics but did account for the fact that different clinical 
specialties were shown different recommendations. To do so, this model included fixed 
effects for each unique recommendation displayed in the survey across all respondents 
(n=63), each specialty-specific block of recommendations (n=27), and whether the 
prompt pertained to the clinician following the recommendation or the patient accepting 
the recommendation. By evaluating only within-specialty variation, this model captured 
potential confounding introduced by variation across specialties in ACO engagement 
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and Choosing Wisely® recommendations’ strength of evidence94 and clinical and 
financial relevance.95–97 
 
Second, we estimated a model that also adjusted for unobserved differences across the 
ten clinician organizations in the ACO by adding fixed effects for the clinician’s 
organization. Finally, we estimated a model that further adjusted for clinician gender, 
age, clinician type/specialty (primary care physician, physician with internal medicine 
specialty, physician with other specialty, surgeon, physician assistant, advanced 
practice nurse), and professional activity (direct patient care, teaching, research, 
administration/management, other). In this model, we compared differences in ACO 
engagement and recommendation implementation among clinicians in the same 
specialty, of the same clinician type, and practicing within the same organization. 
 
We used the American Association for Public Research RR1 response rate for the 
overall survey.98 After survey administration, we restricted our sample to clinician types 
most frequently represented in the Choosing Wisely® campaign (physicians, physician 
assistants, advanced practice nurses), excluding clinical social workers, psychologists, 
audiologists, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, physical therapists, and 
other/unknown (PhD, MBA, MHSA). We excluded clinicians who responded “does not 
apply to my practice” for all recommendations against low-value care. We also excluded 
pediatricians, as they are not typically included in Medicare initiatives targeting adult 
beneficiaries, as well as any clinician who was a member of the research team or 
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included in survey pre-testing (see Figure C1 and Supplemental Methods of Appendix C 
for CONSORT diagram and response rate calculation). 
 
To reduce potential bias from survey nonresponse and generalize estimates to the 
target population (the POM ACO), we applied post-stratification survey weights 
incorporating characteristics associated with non-response (in this case, clinician 
organization). We used iterative proportional fitting, or raking, to calibrate survey 
weights.99 To reduce bias from missing data among respondents, we used multiple 
imputation for all models and implemented a recently-developed quadratic-rule 





Respondent characteristics. Of the 4,701 eligible respondents, 1,620 completed the 
survey (response rate of 34%; Figure C1 in Appendix C). Response rates differed 
across the clinician organizations but were otherwise comparable across clinician 
specialty and sex (Table C6 in Appendix C). The analytic sample for the present 
analysis included 1,289 respondents (Table III.1). Respondents represented a wide 
range of clinician types and specialties, including physician specialists (27%), PCPs 
(18%), internal medicine specialists (16%), and surgeons (10%), as well as advanced 
practice nurses (18%) and physician assistants (11%; Table III.1). Direct patient care 
was the most common professional activity (85%). Most respondents were either 
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employed by a medical school (59%) or hospital (25%), and a majority served on the 
clinical staff of Michigan Medicine (78%). 
 
ACO engagement. ACO engagement of clinicians was low (Table III.2). Most 
respondents were not aware or involved of the decision to join the ACO (69%); 28% 
were aware but not involved, and 3% were involved in the decision-making process. 
Respondents reported limited awareness of ACO incentives and initiatives (Table III.2, 
Table C2 in Appendix C). For example, 23% knew that the ACO was accountable for 
both spending and quality, 9% knew the ACO had successfully lowered spending, 6% 
knew the ACO was accountable for only Medicare patients, and 3% knew the ACO only 
faced upside risk (i.e., could not lose money). Across the six ACO Awareness Scale 
items, the mean respondent knew 0.6 items and the median respondent knew 0 items. 
 
Respondents perceived that the ACO had minimal influence on their practice (Table 
III.3, Table C3 in Appendix C). Few respondents agreed (moderately or strongly) that 
joining an ACO has “made me more aware of controlling treatment costs” (26%), 
“changed how I am compensated” (20%) or “changed how I practice medicine” (18%). 
Only 15% felt they received “useful feedback on ACO cost and quality performance.” 
 
Respondents perceived that the ACO had a minimally positive effect on quality 
improvement (Table III.3, C4 in Appendix C). Few respondents, for example, felt the 
ACO had a positive effect on their ability to coordinate care (18%), reduce inappropriate 
care (14%), or reduce unnecessary hospitalizations (13%). 
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Implementation of recommendations against low-value care. Respondents 
provided 8,448 responses for 27 specialty-specific blocks containing 63 unique 
recommendations against low-value care (Table III.2, Table C5 in Appendix C). On 
average, respondents found that recommendations were less difficult for clinicians to 
follow than for patients to accept. Recommendations were “difficult to follow” for 
clinicians 18% of the time (standard deviation, 38%). Recommendations were “difficult 
to accept” for patients 37% of the time (standard deviation, 48%). 
 
Relationship between ACO engagement and recommendations against low-value 
care. Some dimensions of ACO engagement were associated with implementation of 
recommendations against low-value care (Figures III.1-3.3). In the unadjusted model, 
respondents who aware of the decision to join the ACO were 3.9 percentage points 
(p.p.) less likely to report difficulty implementing recommendations against low-value 
care (95% confidence interval [CI]: -6.2 to -1.6), as compared to respondents who were 
not aware or involved in the decision (Figure III.1). This relationship was not statistically 
significant after adjusting for organization and clinician characteristics (-1.9 p.p., 95% 
CI: -4.3 to 0.5). 
 
Increased awareness of ACO incentives and initiatives was associated with greater 
reported ability to implement recommendations against low-value care (Figure III.2). 
After adjusting for organization and clinician characteristics, a one standard deviation 
(SD) increase in ACO awareness was associated with 2.3 p.p. less reported difficulty 
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implementing recommendations against low-value care (95% CI: -3.8, -0.8), 
representing an 9% improvement (~-2.3 p.p./base likelihood of 27.0%). Perceived 
influence of ACO on practice was not associated with respondents’ reported difficulty 
implementing recommendations against low-value care (Figure III.3, Panel A; 1.1 p.p., 
95% CI: -0.3 to 2.6). Conversely, a 1 SD increase in perceived quality improvement was 
associated with 1.9 p.p. less reported difficulty implementing recommendations (Figure 




In a survey of one of the largest MSSP ACOs in the country, we found limited 
engagement of the frontline clinicians charged with implementing ACO value-based 
initiatives. Few clinicians participated in the decision to join the ACO, fewer yet were 
aware of new organizational financial incentives created by the MSSP, and most 
reported the ACO had limited effect on practice or quality improvement. At the same 
time, greater clinician engagement – in particular, improved awareness of ACO 
incentives and ability to improve care quality – was associated with a modest 
improvement in clinicians’ reported ability to implement recommendations against low-
value care. Taken together, our results suggest that limited engagement of ACO 
clinicians may hamper ACO efforts to reduce low-value care.  
 
There are few data on the degree to which ACOs have engaged individual clinicians in 
efforts to improve health care value. A national survey of PCPs (~78%), internal 
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medicine specialists (~18%) during the early MSSP experience (2014-2015) found 
MSSP ACOs had a modest perceived effect on practice change (e.g., half agreed ACOs 
had influenced care).48 Our study extends these results, finding little ACO engagement 
among physician specialists (e.g., anesthesiologists, dermatologists), surgeons, 
physician assistants, and advanced practices nurses. The positive association between 
ACO incentive awareness and reported ability to implement recommendations against 
low-value care suggests that that improved communication of ACO rules and structures 
to clinicians may help ACO leaders to achieve MSSP objectives. Our results are also 
consistent with the finding that Pioneer ACOs have achieved modest reductions in low-
value care,84 suggesting that inconsistent engagement of ACO clinicians may underlie 
modest results overall. 
 
The ACO model comprises a wide diversity of ACOs. Studies suggests that ACOs 
based in physician practice networks have had greater success lowering spending than 
hospital-integrated ACOs.21 Our finding of low clinician engagement in the POM ACO 
(which includes multiple hospitals) is consistent with the possibility that hospital-
integrated ACOs’ inability to lower spending may be partially due to greater difficulty 
engaging frontline clinicians.  
 
At the same time, the diversity of ACOs also belies an essential commonality – all 
ACOs rely on frontline clinicians to improve quality, eliminate low-value care, and 
achieve spending and quality objectives.48 ACOs’ limited engagement of individual 
clinicians observed in this and previous studies may help to explain ACOs’ relatively 
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modest impact overall.14,21–23,48,84 The disjunction between clinician and organization 
incentives extends well beyond the ACO model. Even as organizations increasingly 
take on risk-based contracts, the most common and substantial financial incentive 
continuing to face clinicians is “productivity,”101 even in practices participating in ACOs36 
or other global payment reforms.101 Our results suggest that transmitting organizational 
incentives to individual clinicians is a challenge but one that may help to achieve 
organizational goals. 
 
Our results shed additional light on a recent survey of PCPs’ perceived barriers to 
implementing recommendations against low-value care, which included perceived 
demands from patients and specialists for treatment and tests, lack of time for shared 
decision-making, and performance systems that reward ordering more services.86 We 
found that perceived improvements in related dimensions of ACO engagement (in the 
Quality Improvement scale, e.g., shared decision-making, managing care between 
visits; and in the ACO Awareness scale, e.g., knowledge of changes to payment 
incentives) were associated with greater reported ability to implement 
recommendations. 
 
Our study must be interpreted in the context of several limitations. First, data from a 
single, large, Medicare ACO in Michigan may not generalize to other ACOs. Second, 
the moderate response rate (34%) raises the possibility of response bias. Although it is 
possible that clinicians with strong opinions about ACOs might have disproportionately 
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chosen to take our survey, this seems unlikely given respondents’ limited ACO 
awareness and relatively tepid perceptions of change in the ACO. Our response rate 
may reflect increasing difficulty conducting clinician surveys in recent years, particularly 
without large financial incentives102 Third, our study measured clinicians’ reported ability 
to implement recommendations against low-value care and not actual practice behavior. 
Finally, causal inference is limited by the cross-sectional nature of this study. Although 
our analytic approach controlled for fixed differences across organizations, clinician 
types and specialties, and other observed clinician characteristics, it is also possible 
that clinicians with greater reported ability to implement recommendations choose to 
engage ACOs in a more effective manner. 
 
Conclusions. Systematic improvements in the value of care provided by ACOs will 
likely require greater engagement of individual clinicians tasked with preserving quality 
and reducing unnecessary care. Our study suggests that current ACO efforts may be 
hampered by individual clinicians’ uncertainty regarding ACO incentives and initiatives. 
Moving forward, research in this area should focus on evaluating the relationship 
between ACO engagement and changes in observed clinician behavior. In addition, it 
will be important to establish methods by which ACOs can more effectively engage 
individual clinicians in efforts to redesign care and improve health care value.
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Table III.1. Characteristics of respondents in accountable care organization 
Respondent characteristics (N=1,277)  
Specialty  
   Primary care physician 18%  
   Physician, medicine specialty 16%  
   Physician, other specialty 10%  
   Surgeon 27%  
   Physician assistant 11%  
    Advanced practice nurse 18%  
Gender  
   Male 49%  
   Female 51%  
Age  
   Under 35 13%  
   35-44 34%  
   45-54 22%  
   55-64 22%  
   65 or older 8%  
Professional activity  
   Direct patient care 85%  
   Teaching 3%  
   Research 7%  
   Administration/management 3%  
   Other 2%  
Practice arrangement  
   Employed by a medical school 59%  
   Employed by a hospital 25%  
   Employed by a managed care organization 1%  
   Solo practice 2%  
   Single specialty group practice 4%  
   Multi-specialty group practice 7%  
   Other 2%  
Professional activity  
   Direct patient care 78%  
   Teaching 9%  
   Research 4%  
   Administration/management 3%  
   Other 1%  
Clinician organization 1%  
   Michigan Medicine 2%  
   IHA 2%  
   Huron Valley Physicians Association 0%  
   MidMichigan 0%  
   St Mary's of Michigan 18%  
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   Advance Health 16%  
   Wexford PHO Crawford PHO 10%  
   Oakland Southfield Physician 27%  
   Oakland Southfield Physician 11%  
   Olympia Medical Services 18%  
 
Notes: Physicians included MDs, DOs, and international degrees such as MBBS. 
Advanced practice nurses included certified nurse midwives, certified nurse 
anesthetists, and nurse practitioners. Primary care physicians included the following 
specialties: Family Medicine; General Internal Medicine; Geriatrics; Palliative medicine; 
Hospitalist; Primary care; General Practice; and Preventive Medicine.
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Participation in decision to join ACO % Respondents 
   I was involved in the decision-making process 3%  
   I was not involved but was aware of the decision-making process 28%  
   I was not involved or aware of the decision-making process 69%  
ACO Awareness (1=correct,0=incorrect or don't know) % Respondents 
Held accountable for both spending and quality 23%  
Lowered spending in most recent performance year 9%  
Emphasized conducting Welcome to Medicare and Annual Wellness 
visits 
17%  
Did not receive a financial bonus from Medicare in most recent 
performance year 
3%  
Does not face downside financial risk, i.e., cannot lose money 3%  
Held accountable for only Medicare patients 6%  
Six-item ACO Awareness Scale (possible range: 0 to 6,  
Cronbach α score, 0.72) 
Total=0.6 
ACO Practice Change (1=strongly disagree, 2=moderately agree, 
3=moderately agree, 4=strongly agree) 
Mean (SD) 
Joining an ACO has changed how I practice medicine 1.7 (0.8) 
Joining an ACO has improved the quality of care my patients receive 1.9 (0.8) 
Joining an ACO has made me more aware of controlling treatment 
costs 
1.9 (0.8) 
Joining an ACO has changed how I am compensated 1.7 (0.8) 
I receive useful feedback on ACO cost and quality performance 1.6 (0.8) 
ACO financial bonuses are large enough to influence my behavior 1.4 (0.6) 
Six-item ACO Practice Change Scale (possible range: 6 to 24, 
Cronbach α score, 0.88) 
Total=10.3 
ACO Quality Improvement (-1=negative impact,0=no impact or don't 
know,1=positive impact) 
Mean (SD) 
Coordinate care across care settings 0.1 (0.4) 
Decrease unnecessary hospitalizations 0.1 (0.3) 
Help patients manage care between visits 0.1 (0.4) 
Engage in shared decision-making 0.1 (0.4) 
Reduce inappropriate or harmful care 0.1 (0.4) 
Improve health of low-income patients 0.1 (0.3) 
Improve health of medically complex patients 0.1 (0.4) 
Seven-item ACO Quality Improvement Scale (possible range: -7 to 7, 
Cronbach α score, 0.88) 
Total=0.9 
 
Scale development is described in the main text. Survey weights were applied to 
generalize to the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO. Multiple imputation was 
used for missing data. ACO is accountable care organization. SD is standard deviation.
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Table III.3. Examples of recommendations against low-value care presented to respondents 
 
Specialty Examples of recommendations against low-value care 
Difficult for 
clinician to follow 







Overall sample  17.7% 36.4% 8470 
All specialties Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 36.5% 58.1% 1649 
Anesthesiology 
Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without 
ongoing blood loss and hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or 
hemodynamically unstable. 
10.1% 17.6% 200 
Cardiology Don’t perform annual stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive imaging as part of routine follow-up in asymptomatic patients. 2.9% 23.2% 139 
Dermatology Don’t routinely use topical antibiotics on a surgical wound. 0.0% 10.0% 40 
Emergency 
Medicine 
Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test 
probability of PE. 23.2% 21.4% 112 
Endocrinology Don’t prescribe testosterone therapy unless there is biochemical evidence of testosterone deficiency. 0.0% 64.7% 34 
Gastroenterolo
gy 
For a patient with functional abdominal pain syndrome (as per ROME IV criteria) 
computed tomography (CT) scans should not be repeated unless there is a major 
change in clinical findings or symptoms. 
6.3% 50.0% 32 
Hematology 
Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without 
ongoing blood loss and hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or 
hemodynamically unstable. 
25.0% 65.0% 40 
Neurology Don’t perform imaging of the carotid arteries for simple syncope without other neurologic symptoms. 6.1% 6.3% 65 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology Don’t treat patients who have mild dysplasia of less than two years in duration. 12.3% 35.9% 129 
Oncology 
Don’t perform surveillance testing (biomarkers) or imaging (PET, CT, and radionuclide 
bone scans) for asymptomatic individuals who have been treated for breast cancer with 
curative intent. 
11.4% 36.4% 68 
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Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are 
present. 11.5% 50.0% 52 
Primary Care 
Don’t routinely prescribe antibiotics for acute mild-to-moderate sinusitis unless 
symptoms last for seven or more days, or symptoms worsen after initial clinical 
improvement. 
8.7% 69.8% 575 
Psychiatry Don’t routinely prescribe two or more antipsychotic medications concurrently. 13.5% 5.3% 75 
Rheumatology Don’t prescribe biologics for rheumatoid arthritis before a trial of methotrexate (or other conventional non-biologic DMARDs). 7.1% 28.6% 28 
Surgery Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 34.9% 36.6% 336 
Urology Don’t routinely perform PSA-based screening for prostate cancer. 68.2% 72.7% 44 
 
Respondents were shown four recommendations against low-value care. Recommendations were drawn from the 
Choosing Wisely® campaign. For reach recommendation, respondents were asked two questions: “Do you find this 
recommendation easy or difficult to follow most of the time?” (easy to follow, difficult to follow, does not apply to my 
practice); and “Do most patients find this recommendation easy or difficult to accept?” (easy to accept, difficult to accept, 
does not apply to my practice). All respondent were given the following recommendation: “Don’t recommend cancer 
screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 year,” as well as three specialty-specific recommendations. One 
specialty (Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation) was not shown the cancer screening recommendation due to survey 
administration error. Regression analyses of the association between ACO engagement and recommendations against 
low-value care excluded responses where clinicians indicated the recommendation “Does not apply to my practice” 
(n=1517, 17.8% of total responses). Survey weights were applied to generalize to the Physician Organization of Michigan 
ACO.
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The reference group is clinicians who were not involved in or aware of the decision to join the ACO. Models are described 
in the main text. Survey weights were applied to generalize to the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO. Multiple 
imputation was used for missing data. ACO is accountable care organization. CI is confidence interval.
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Estimated change is for a one standard deviation increase in the ACO Awareness scale. The scale and models are 
described in the main text. Survey weights were applied to generalize to the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO. 
Multiple imputation was used for missing data. ACO is accountable care organization. CI is confidence interval.
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Figure III.3. Relationship between perceived ACO impact on practice and quality and low-value care  
 
Panel A. ACO Practice Change scale 
 
Panel B. ACO Quality Improvement scale 
 
Estimated change is for a one standard deviation increase in either the ACO Practice Change scale (Panel A) or the ACO 
Quality Improvement scale (Panel B). Scales and models are described in the main text. Survey weights were applied to 
generalize to the Physician Organization of Michigan ACO. Multiple imputation was used for missing data. ACO is 











Appendix A. Changes in Spending and Quality in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program After Accounting for Non-Random Exit 
 




A. Study data, beneficiary attribution, and outcome specification 
 
B. Calculating Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) supply as an instrumental 
variable 
 
C. Assessing differential trends in spending prior to the MSSP 
 
D. Estimating the impact of the MSSP on changes in spending and quality 
 
E. Evaluating compositional changes in the MSSP 
 
F. Instrumental variable sensitivity analyses 
 
G. Supplemental analyses of MSSP exit and entry by provider groups 
 
Figure A1. Schematic of the MSSP supply instrumental variable 
 
Figure A2. Pre-period trends in spending across the instrumental variable  
 
Figure A3. Pre-period trends in spending across observed MSSP participation status 
 
Figure A4. Changes in total Medicare spending according to ACOs' year of entry into 
the MSSP 
 
Figure A5. Association between county-level MSSP penetration and Medicare 
Advantage penetration 
 
Figure A6. Robustness tests of MSSP supply as an instrumental variable
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Figure A7. Changes in hospital use for beneficiaries attributed to MSSP ACOs vs. 
controls 
 
Figure A8. Sensitivity analyses of association clinician spending performance and 
probability of exiting an MSSP ACO 
 
Figure A9. Association between provider group spending performance and probability of 
exiting or entering an MSSP ACO 
 
 
Table A1. Non-linear estimation of discount factor used in MSSP supply 
 
Table A2. Pre-period trends in spending across observed MSSP status 
 
Table A3. Formal test of statistical differences between instrumental variable and 
adjusted longitudinal model 
 
Table A4. Sensitivity analyses of adjusted longitudinal and instrumental variable models 
 
Table A5. Estimates of the association between prior spending and probability of joining 
or exiting an MSSP ACO 
 
Table A6. Simulated changes in average MSSP beneficiary spending with attrition of 
high-cost clinicians from MSSP ACOs (2013-2014) 
 
Table A7. Simulated changes in average MSSP beneficiary spending when including 
clinicians exiting MSSP and excluding clinicians entering the MSSP (2013-2014) 
 




Section A. Study data, beneficiary attribution, and outcome specification 
 
i. Study data. Accountable care organizations (ACOs) entering Medicare Shared 
Savings Program (MSSP) contracts receive financial bonuses (“shared-savings”) from 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) if they lower average total 
Medicare spending below a spending benchmark and meet quality performance 
standards. To estimate the association between the MSSP and changes in spending, 
hospital use, and quality performance, our analysis strategy required longitudinal 
Medicare claims data at the beneficiary-quarter level before and after the staggered 
start of the MSSP (to create a pre-post study design that precisely captured entry to and 
exit from MSSP contracts); MSSP data on who belongs to which ACOs; spatial data 
from CMS and the US Census on where clinicians work and beneficiaries live (to 
calculate MSSP supply); and, to control for confounders, beneficiary information from 
the American Community Survey (ACS) and CMS claims and enrollment files. 
 
Medicare claims and enrollment files. Our analyses were based on a 20% random 
sample of Medicare claims, including the following Research Identifiable Files (RIFs): 
Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR), which captures payments for 
inpatient and skilled nursing facility services; Carrier, which captures payments for 
physician services; Outpatient; Master Beneficiary Summary File, which captures 
patient enrollment and sociodemographic information; the ACO Beneficiary-Level file, 
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which identifies beneficiaries attributed to the MSSP and the ACOs to which they were 
attributed; and the ACO Provider-Level file, which identifies the clinicians and provider 
groups, (as identified by Taxpayer Identification Number [TIN]), participating in MSSP 
ACOs. 
 
American Community Survey (ACS). We used ACS data to define beneficiary area-
level poverty and educational attainment for each year of the study. We obtained five-
year estimates of ZIP code tabulation area (ZCTA) poverty (proportion living below 
100% of the federal poverty level) and educational attainment (proportion with a high 
school degree or equivalent, proportion graduated from college).72 We used the final 
year of the 5-year estimate for each study period (e.g., ACS 2014-2010 data for study 
year 2014). Because complete, ZCTA-level 5-year ACS estimates only began in the 
2006-2010 wave, we used 2006-2010 data for study years 2008 through 2010. For each 
year of the analysis, we linked beneficiaries to ZCTA-level ACS data using beneficiary 
ZIP codes provided in CMS Master Beneficiary Summary File. 
 
US Census Gazetteer. For each year of the study, we identified the latitude and 
longitude of all beneficiary residencies and clinician practice locations. To do so, we 
drew on ZCTA-level geographic data provided by the US Gazetteer data and collected 
by the US Census (further linkage information is provided below). 
 
Rural-urban continuum areas (RUCA). We used RUCA codes to categorize 
beneficiaries and clinicians as residing in urban, large rural, small rural, or isolated ZIP 
 87 
codes.70 We followed the RUCA categorization scheme to categorize the 33 RUCA 
codes in the following manner: urban (RUCA codes 1.0, 1.1, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1, 
8.1, 10.1); large rural cities/towns (4.0, 4.2, 5.0, 5.2, 6.0, 6.1); small rural towns (7.0, 
7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 8.0, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2); and Isolated (10.0, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 
10.6). 
 
Hospital Referral Region (HRR). We linked beneficiary and clinician ZIP codes to 
HRRs using a crosswalk provided by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.103 We 
excluded beneficiaries who resided outside of HRRs or were attributed to clinicians who 
practiced outside of HRRs (see Figure A1 for CONSORT diagram). 
 
ii. Beneficiary Attribution 
 
We defined our main exposure of interest, beneficiary attribution to an MSSP ACO, as a 
time-varying indicator that equaled 1 if the beneficiary was in an MSSP ACO in the 
given quarter, 0 otherwise. We used a time-varying quarterly ACO indicator rather than 
stably attributing beneficiaries to an ACO or control TIN for the entire study period for 
two reasons. First, this captured the staggered entry of ACOs into MSSP contracts, 
which occurred in April 2012, July 2012, January 2013, and January 2014. Second, this 
reflected the fact that beneficiaries and clinicians can enter, exit, and transition between 
MSSP ACOs each year. 
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For each year of the study, we attributed beneficiaries to the provider group and 
clinician from which they received the plurality of eligible primary care services. 
Following MSSP specifications104 and prior work,21,22,58 we first linked beneficiaries to 
the provider TIN from which they received the plurality of eligible primary care services. 
To do so, we identified whether the beneficiary was attributed to an MSSP ACO using 
the ACO Beneficiary-Level RIF. Next, for those beneficiaries attributed to an MSSP 
ACO, we identified the TINs participating in the ACO for that given year. Among those 
TINs, we then attributed beneficiaries to the TIN from which they received the plurality 
of eligible primary care services, defined by the MSSP as the sum of eligible outpatient 
evaluation and management services (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System 
codes: 99201 through 99215; 99304 through 99350; G0402; G0438; and G0439.)104 
 
We next attributed beneficiaries to a specific clinician within the ACO-TIN to which they 
were attributed above. Although the MSSP does not attribute beneficiaries to individual 
clinicians within a TIN or ACO, our study needed to form beneficiary-clinician units in 
order to define the instrumental variable (MSSP supply) at the level of the individual 
clinician. To ensure that beneficiaries were attributed to clinicians within the ACO-TIN 
considered accountable for beneficiary outcomes by the MSSP, we mirrored MSSP 
attribution methodology in attributing beneficiaries to the clinician within the attributed 
ACO-TIN who provided the plurality of eligible primary care services, as defined above. 
Because CMS extended the performance for ACOs entering MSSP contracts in either 
April or July 2012 through the end of 2013, we attributed MSSP beneficiaries to MSSP 
TINs and clinicians from which they received the plurality of eligible services across the 
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years 2012 and 2013.  We followed an analogous procedure for attributing control 
beneficiaries to non-MSSP TINs and clinicians, defining controls as those beneficiaries 
not listed in the ACO Beneficiary-Level RIF in the given year of interest. 
 
As specified by the MSSP, we divided the attribution process described above into two 
steps. In step 1 of the MSSP algorithm, we attributed beneficiaries to a TIN on the basis 
of only those eligible services furnished by a primary care physician (PCP), defined by 
claim specialty codes for general practice, family practice, internal medicine, or geriatric 
medicine. If a beneficiary could be attributed in this manner, we then attributed the 
beneficiary to the PCP who furnished the plurality of eligible services within the 
attributed TIN.  
 
Following prior work21,22,58 and in order to make ACO and control beneficiaries more 
comparable, we attributed beneficiaries to TINs on the basis of outpatient claims alone 
and excluded beneficiaries who were: 1) attributed on basis of eligible services 
furnished by non-PCP clinicians eligible for attribution in the MSSP (i.e., step 2 of the 
MSSP algorithm); 2) attributed to a clinician who was ineligible for attribution in the 
MSSP; or 3) not attributed to any clinician (because they did not receive eligible 
services).  
 
iii. Outcome specifications 
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Spending. We defined total spending per Medicare beneficiary as the total price-
standardized spending for inpatient, outpatient, physician, and skilled nursing facility 
services. We price-standardized to account for variations resulting from regional wage 
indices and payments for indirect medical education, Disproportionate Share Hospitals, 
and new technologies. We defined component spending as inpatient care (from the 
MedPAR RIF), outpatient care (from the Outpatient RIF), professional services (from the 
Carrier RIF), and skilled nursing facility spending (from the MedPAR RIF). 
 
Hospitalization. We defined all-cause hospitalizations as any inpatient stay during the 
quarter of interest. We defined 30-day readmissions according to MSSP 
specifications.62 We included 30-day all-cause readmissions as this outcome is included 
in MSSP contracts. We defined preventable hospitalizations as hospitalization for any 1 
of 11 ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (ACSCs), defined by the Agency for 
Healthcare Quality and Research (AHRQ) as conditions for which “good outpatient care 
can potentially prevent the need for hospitalization or for which early intervention can 
prevent complications or more severe disease”. We followed AHRQ specifications in 
constructing the numerators and denominators for each ACSC measure.61 We created 
a composite measure comprising 11 ACSCs that we chose on the basis of meeting one 
of the following three criteria: 1) specifically included in ACO contracts (heart failure, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder or asthma); 2) related to ACO quality measures 
for diabetes or heart disease that could not be assessed using claims data (uncontrolled 
diabetes, diabetes short-term complications, diabetes long-term complications, diabetes 
lower-leg amputation, hypertension, angina); or 3) captured quality performance for 
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acute conditions (dehydration, pneumonia, and urinary tract infection). For all 
hospitalization outcomes, we defined hospitalization as the count per beneficiary per 
quarter. 
 
Clinical quality indicators. We chose 4 clinical quality process indicators that can be 
captured accurately in claims and are either included as quality measures in MSSP 
contracts or are in the clinical pathway toward quality measures included in MSSP 
contracts.62 Because the MSSP includes several measures pertaining to diabetes care, 
we included 3 measures of preventive care services for beneficiaries with diabetes: (1) 
glycated hemoglobin testing (chosen as a process measure related to ACO quality 
measure DM-2, hemoglobin A1c poor control); (2) low-density lipoprotein cholesterol 
(LDL-C) testing (related to DM-13, LDL-C control); and (3) diabetic retinal examinations 
(included in MSSP contracts as DM-7). To match our quarterly estimation strategy, we 
defined the beneficiary as meeting each respective measure if he or she received the 
service in that quarter (1=yes, 0=no). We followed National Quality Form specifications 
for defining receipt of glycated hemoglobin testing, LDL-C testing, and diabetes retinal 
examinations.105 We used a claims-based method for identifying beneficiaries with 
diabetes according to Chronic Disease Warehouse specifications, defining beneficiaries 
as those with the presence of specified claims in the previous year.106 In addition to the 
3 diabetes quality indicators, we included mammography provision among female 
beneficiaries ages 65-69 (ACO quality measure ACO-Prev-5; NQF 0031).107 Following 
NQF specifications, we defined the eligible beneficiaries as meeting the measure if they 
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received a mammogram within the quarter of interest or any of the prior 7 quarters 
(1=yes, 0=no). 
 
Hip fracture. As a falsification test, we evaluated the impact of the MSSP on changes 
in the rate of hospitalization for hip fracture. Following prior work,27 we defined hip 
fracture as the presence of an acute care hospital claim with a primary diagnosis of hip 
fracture (820.xx) in a given quarter (1=yes, 0=no).  
 
Section B. Calculating MSSP supply as an instrumental variable 
 
A schematic depicting calculation of MSSP supply is presented below (Figure A1). To 
capture market-level variation, we calculated the total count of MSSP and non-MSSP 
clinicians within 50 miles of the clinician’s practice location. We defined clinician practice 
location using the modal 5-digit ZIP code listed in Part B claims for that clinician for that 
study year. We then obtained latitude and longitude data by linking Part B ZIP codes to 
ZCTA-level geographic data from the US Census Gazetteer files.108 For ZIP codes that 
could not be linked to US Census latitude and longitude data, we used nearby ZIP 
codes (indicated by numeric sequence of the ZIP code) within that same year and then 
across study years. We then calculated the distance between two clinicians’ practice 
locations using Stata’s user-written –geonear- command, 109 which estimates the 
geodetic distance between length of the shortest curve between two points (specified by 
latitude and longitude) along the surface of a mathematical model of the earth. 
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To capture small-area variation, we then discounted clinicians relatively further away 
within the 50-mile radius by a discount factor 𝛽𝛽.110 Because we are unaware of any data 
on how distance to other ACO clinicians affects clinicians’ willingness to join an ACO, 
we empirically estimated this discount factor. Under the hypothesis that the effect of 
distance on the likelihood of two clinicians entering a joint MSSP contract varies by 
population density, we estimated this relationship separately by urbanicity, as classified 
by the four RUCA categorizations defined above. 
 
Specifically, we calculated the discount factor 𝛽𝛽 by estimating how the likelihood of two 
clinicians participating in the same MSSP ACO varied by the inverse distance between 
those two clinicians. For clinicians 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑘𝑘, separated by distance 𝑑𝑑, and whose practice 
location has urbanicity 𝑟𝑟, we used non-linear least-squares67 to estimate the following 
equation: 
 






where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is 1 if clinician 𝑗𝑗 belongs to the same MSSP ACO as clinician 𝑘𝑘, 0 
otherwise. We implemented this non-linear analysis using Stata’s –nl– command.111 For 
computational reasons, we estimated the beneficiary and clinician discount factors on a 
2% sample of unique clinicians, although the effective analytic size is larger, as the 
random samples were drawn before matching each clinician to all other clinicians within 
the 50-mile radius. As expected, distance exerted a strong negative effect on the 
probability of two clinicians participating in the same MSSP ACO, with this effect 
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greatest in large urban areas, intermediate in rural cities or towns, and smallest in 
isolated areas (eTable1). As a robustness test, we estimated the impact of the MSSP 
on spending using instrumental variable models that used MSSP supply restricted to 
within a 10-, 25-, 50-, 75-, and 150-mile radius of the clinician’s practice, with or without 
discounting clinicians who practiced further away within the given radius. 
 
Section C. Assessing differential trends in spending prior to the MSSP 
 
We tested for whether spending trends prior to the start of the MSSP varied across the 
instrumental variable (high vs. low MSSP supply) and observed MSSP participation 
status (beneficiaries who ultimately joined the MSSP vs. those that never joined the 
MSSP). High vs. low MSSP supply was defined by whether the attributed clinician’s 
median MSSP value was above (1=high) or equal to or below (0=low) the median 
MSSP supply value for the HRR over the entire post-period, which was designated 
independently for each HRR as beginning with the first quarter in which the HRR 
contained at least one clinician participating in the MSSP. Observed MSSP participation 
status was defined using an indicator for whether the beneficiary was ultimately 
attributed to an MSSP ACO (1=ever, 0=never). 
 
We tested for differential pre-period spending trends across the instrumental by 
estimating a linear spline model that included an indicator for high MSSP supply, a 
linear term for time, a pre-period linear spline (demarcated by Quarter 1/Quarter 2, 
2012, i.e., April 2012), a post-period linear spline, interaction terms between the high 
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MSSP supply indicator and the pre- and post-period linear splines, seasonal indicators, 
year fixed effects, and market fixed effects. In these spline models, differential trends in 
the pre-period were identified by the coefficient for the interaction term between the high 
MSSP supply indicator and the pre-period linear spline. We also graphically depicted 
adjusted trends in average spending in each quarter across the instrumental variable. 
Adjusted spending was estimated using a model that included market fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, seasonality, beneficiary characteristics, an indicator for each quarter, an 
indicator for high MSSP supply, and an interaction term between high MSSP supply and 
the quarter of interest, but did not impose an underlying time trend on the adjusted 
spending data. From these models, Stata’s –margins- command was used to estimate 
predicted spending for beneficiaries with high- vs. low-MSSP supply in each quarter. 
 
Differential pre-period spending trends across observed MSSP participation status were 
tested using an analogous spline model that included an indicator for whether the 
beneficiary was ever attributed to an MSSP ACO or never attributed to an MSSP ACO. 
We also graphically depicted adjusted trends in average spending in each quarter 
across the 4 MSSP ACO cohorts using a model similar to instrumental variable model 
described above, now interacting the quarter of interest with an indicator for the 
beneficiary’s ultimate MSSP cohort status (0=never in an MSSP ACO, 1=2012 April 
cohort, 2=2012 July cohort, 3=2013 cohort, 4=2014 cohort).  
 
Spline and adjusted trend analyses demonstrated that spending trends in the pre-period 
were similar across beneficiaries with high vs. low MSSP supply (differential trend, –$2 
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per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: -$4 to -$1; Figure A2 and Table A2 in Appendix A). In 
contrast, spending trends in pre-period differed substantially across MSSP beneficiaries 
and controls (differential trend, $18 per beneficiary-quarter; 95% CI: $16 to $19; Figure 
A3 and Table A2 in Appendix A), a violation of the parallel trends assumption. 
 
Section D. Estimating the impact of the MSSP on spending and quality 
 
We analyzed associations between changes in spending, hospital utilization, and quality 
and beneficiary attribution to an MSSP ACO. To identify the degree to which selection 
bias affects current conclusions about the impact of the MSSP on spending, we 
estimated 2 linear regression models for each outcome of interest. First, we estimated 
adjusted longitudinal models that accounted for market-level factors, secular trends, 
seasonality, and beneficiary characteristics. Specifically, for outcome 𝑌𝑌 (e.g., total 
spending), clinician 𝑖𝑖, attributed beneficiary 𝑗𝑗, in HRR 𝑘𝑘, quarter 𝑞𝑞, season 𝑟𝑟, and year 𝑡𝑡, 
we estimated the following model: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽1�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 is 1 if the beneficiary was attributed to an MSSP ACO, 0 otherwise, with 
the quarterly subscript indicating that MSSP ACOs enter MSSP contracts within a given 
year; 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of beneficiary characteristics (described in the main article); 𝜇𝜇 
represents HRR fixed effects accounting for fixed sources of confounding across 
markets; 𝜔𝜔 represents year fixed effects accounting for common shocks across markets 
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in a given year; 𝜃𝜃 is a quarter indicator accounting for seasonal trends; and 𝜁𝜁 is the 
idiosyncratic error term. 
 
Second, we estimated instrumental variable models that are analogous to the adjusted 
longitudinal models above but used MSSP supply as an instrumental variable (defined 
in the section B of the eAppendix). By replacing clinicians’ observed MSSP status with 
their predicted probability of MSSP participation, these two-stage least squares models 
may address residual sources of time-varying confounding that exist between clinician-
beneficiary pairs who share similar observable characteristics and reside in the same 
area. For clinician 𝑖𝑖, attributed beneficiary 𝑗𝑗, in HRR 𝑘𝑘, quarter 𝑞𝑞, season 𝑟𝑟, and year 𝑡𝑡, 
we estimated the first-stage relationship between MSSP ACO participation and MSSP 
supply: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =  𝛿𝛿1�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
 
where 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 is 1 if the beneficiary was attributed to an MSSP ACO, 0 otherwise; 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀_𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 was the MSSP supply to which the clinician was exposed; 𝑋𝑋 is a vector of 
beneficiary characteristics; 𝜇𝜇 represents HRR fixed effects; 𝜔𝜔 represents year fixed 
effects; 𝜃𝜃 is the quarter indicator; and 𝜀𝜀 is the idiosyncratic error term. In the second 
stage, we incorporate predicted MSSP participation from the first stage, 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀� , to 
identify the effect of the MSSP on outcome 𝑌𝑌: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾1�𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀� 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖  + 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗  + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
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As before, we included a vector of beneficiary (𝑋𝑋) covariates, HRR fixed effects (𝜇𝜇); year 
fixed effects (𝜔𝜔); quarter indicators (𝜃𝜃), and an idiosyncratic error term (𝜑𝜑). In this 
instrumental variable framework, the effect of the MSSP on spending and quality is 
identified under the assumption that within-market changes to MSSP supply are 
unrelated to potential changes in spending and quality after accounting for secular 
trends, seasonality, fixed differences across markets, and observed beneficiary 
characteristics. In contrast to standard longitudinal models, instrumental variable 
models capture treatment effects among “marginal” clinicians, i.e., those participating in 
the MSSP due to greater exposure to MSSP supply. 
 
Section E. Evaluating compositional changes in the MSSP 
 
To identify the degree to which changes in the composition of MSSP participants drives 
performance estimates, we evaluated changes in hip fracture and spending using 
across five sets of longitudinal models. First, we estimated a market-year fixed effects 
model that included fixed effects for each HRR* year, thus capturing market-specific 
spending trends. Second, we estimated a beneficiary fixed effects model that included 
beneficiary fixed effects and year fixed effects. Third, we estimated a model that 
included market-year fixed effects, ACO fixed effects, and year fixed effects. In the ACO 
fixed effects models, each ACO was defined as a fixed collection of all TINs that 
ultimately formed an MSSP ACO together; control TINs that never participated in the 
MSSP all received the same (control) indicator when defining ACO fixed effects. For 
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TINs that participated in multiple MSSP ACOs over the study period, we attributed TINs 
to the MSSP ACO that encompassed the plurality of the TIN’s attributed beneficiaries 
during the post-MSSP period. To improve the computational feasibility of estimating 
models that included both ACO fixed effects and market-year fixed effects, we 
designated market-years as the panel variable (using Stata’s –xtset– command) and 
included covariates that were mean-centered for each ACO (to capture ACO fixed 
effects). 
 
Fourth, we estimated a clinician fixed effects model that included clinician fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. As in our instrumental variable analysis, beneficiaries were first 
attributed to TINs and then to clinicians within the attributed TIN based on the plurality 
of eligible primary care services (see section A). Finally, we estimated an adjusted 
longitudinal model that additionally adjusted for the share of beneficiaries in the county 
participating in MA (i.e., MA penetration). For all of the models described above, we 
included a time-varying indicator for whether the beneficiary was attributed to an MSSP 
ACO in a given quarter, a quarter indicator (to capture seasonal trends), and the 
beneficiary characteristics described in the main article. Models including beneficiary 
fixed effects omitted time-invariant characteristics (i.e., race/ethnicity, disability as the 
original reason for Medicare entitlement, end-stage renal disease as the original reason 
for Medicare entitlement). All analyses specified robust standard errors to account for 
clustering at the market level. 
 
Section F. Instrumental variable sensitivity analyses 
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We performed several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our instrumental 
variable model. First, in order to address potential area-level relationships between 
participation in managed care and MSSP ACOs, we estimated an instrumental variable 
model that adjusted for county-level MA penetration, a proxy for managed care. 
Second, we estimated an instrumental variable model that included market-year fixed 
effects instead of market fixed effects and year fixed effects. This accounted for 
potential market-specific trends in spending or quality that may be associated with 
market-level changes in MSSP supply. Third, we estimated an instrumental variable 
model that included both market-year fixed effects and ACO fixed effects (using 
covariates that were mean-centered for each ACO). This accounted for potential small-
area variations in practices patterns or beneficiaries that may confound the relationship 
between MSSP supply and performance that may exist at a more local level not 
captured by market fixed effects. Finally, we estimated models that were analogous to 
our base instrumental variable model but that used MSSP supply restricted to within 10, 
25, 50, 75, or 150 miles from the clinician’s practice, with or without discounting the 
supply of providers relatively further away within a given radius (defined in the section B 
of the eAppendix). For each instrumental variable model described above, we estimated 
the impact of the MSSP on spending and hip fracture (the falsification outcome). 




G. Supplemental analyses of MSSP exit and entry. To determine whether MSSP 
ACOs strategically recruit or prune clinicians according to prior spending performance, 
we tested whether a clinician’s spending performance predicted the probability of the 
clinician entering or exiting an existing MSSP ACO in the subsequent year. We 
determined clinician participation in the MSSP by linking clinicians via their NPI to the 
provider-level SSP RIF. In the main analysis, prior spending performance was defined 
as the clinician’s average Medicare spending per beneficiary per year for the three 
years prior to MSSP exit or entry determination. In these analyses, we directly attributed 
beneficiaries to clinicians (vs. TINs) from whom they received the plurality of eligible 
evaluation and management services in the outpatient setting, as defined by the 
MSSP.57 
 
In our models, we estimated the probability of entering or exiting the MSSP as a 
function of market fixed effects, year fixed effects, average spending, and average 
beneficiary characteristics of the clinician’s panel. These characteristics included 
average beneficiary age, sex, race/ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, or other/unknown), 
disability, end-stage renal disease, dual-eligibility for Medicaid (months of enrollment), 
the CMS Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score, and area-level poverty 
(proportion below federal poverty level) and education (proportion graduated from high 
school, college). We included quadratic spending terms to allow for any potential non-
linearities in the relationship between spending and MSSP exit or entry. 
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Analyses of MSSP exit were restricted to clinicians participating in the MSSP during the 
year prior to analysis. Analyses of MSSP entry were restricted to clinicians not 
participating in the MSSP during the year prior to analysis and did not include ACO 
formation, i.e., participation in an ACO’s first contract year. Both sets of analyses were 
restricted to ACOs entering MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013, as the use of 2012-2014 
MSSP data precluded the ability to observe exit or entry into ACOs formed in 2014. 
Results were robust when using clinician’s average spending in the prior year (Figure 
A8 in Appendix A, Panel A) or prior two years (Panel B), or when not adjusting for the 
average characteristics of the clinician’s attributed beneficiaries (Panel C). We also 
analyzed MSSP exit at the level of the provider group (i.e., TIN), finding no consistent 
relationship between group’s prior spending performance and subsequent MSSP exit 
(Figure A9 in Appendix A).
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Figure A6. Robustness tests of MSSP supply as an instrumental variable 
 




Figure A6. Robustness tests of MSSP supply as an instrumental variable 
 
Panel B. Changes in total spending 
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Figure A8. Sensitivity analyses of association between clinician spending 
performance and probability of exiting an MSSP ACO 
 














Figure A9. Association between provider group spending performance and 
probability of exiting or entering an MSSP ACO 
 










Table A1. Non-linear estimation of discount factor used in MSSP supply 
 
 Rural-Urban Commuting Area categorization 
Probability of two 
clinicians belonging 
to same MSSP 
ACO 
Urban Large rural cities/towns 
Small rural 
towns Isolated 










Sample size 2,668,375 69,273 20,634 9,963 
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Table A2. Pre-period trends in spending across observed MSSP status 
 
 
Observed MSSP status vs. 
instrumental variable 
Difference in spending 
levels in pre-period, $ 
(95% CI) 
Difference in 
spending trends in 
pre-period, $ per 
quarter (95% CI) 
P 
value 
MSSP participants vs. non-
participants (observed MSSP 
status -642 (-670, -614) 18 (16, 19) <0.001 
High vs. low MSSP supply 
(instrumental variable) 48 (19, 76) -2 (-4, -1) 0.001 
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Table A3. Formal test of statistical differences between instrumental variable and 
adjusted longitudinal model 
 
Study outcome Difference-in-Sargan, P valuea 
Total Medicare spending <0.001 
Hip fracture 0.001 
Glycated hemoglobin testing 0.021 
LDL cholesterol testing 0.021 
Diabetic retinal examination 0.015 
All three diabetes measures 0.019 
Mammography 0.007 
All-cause hospitalizations 0.335 
Preventable hospitalizations 0.404 
Emergency department visits 0.873 
a Statistical difference between estimates from the instrumental variable 
model and adjusted longitudinal model was tested via the difference-in-
Sargan statistic.75 
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Table A4. Sensitivity analyses of adjusted longitudinal and instrumental variable 
models 
 
Hip fracture Change (95% CI) P value 
Adjusted longitudinal + MA penetration -0.28 (-0.36, -0.19) <0.001 
Instrumental variable + MA penetration 0.11 (-0.06, 0.27) 0.210 
Instrumental variable + market-year fixed effects -0.17 (-0.43, 0.09) 0.205 
Instrumental variable + market-year + ACO fixed effects 0.04 (-0.32, 0.39) 0.840 
Total spending   
Adjusted longitudinal + MA penetration -116 (-148, -83) <0.001 
Instrumental variable + MA penetration 12 (-44, 68) 0.680 
Instrumental variable + market-year fixed effects 32 (-44, 109) 0.406 
Instrumental variable + market-year + ACO fixed effects -19 (-149, 111) 0.776 
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Table A5. Estimates of the association between prior spending and probability of 
joining or exiting an MSSP ACO 
 
Average spending in prior three 
years 
Probability of clinician 
entering MSSP ACO, % 
(95% CI) 
Risk 
difference* P value* 
1st percentile 0.6 (0.2, 1.1) -1.2 <0.001 
5th percentile 1.0 (0.6, 1.3) -0.9 <0.001 
10th percentile 1.2 (0.9, 1.4) -0.7 <0.001 
25th percentile 1.5 (1.3, 1.6) -0.4 <0.001 
50th percentile 1.8 (1.8, 1.9) -- † -- † 
75th percentile 2.3 (2.2, 2.4) 0.5 <0.001 
90th percentile 3.0 (2.7, 3.3) 1.1 <0.001 
95th percentile 3.6 (3.1, 4.1) 1.8 <0.001 
99th percentile 5.6 (4.5, 6.7) 3.7 <0.001 
Average spending in prior three 
years 
Probability of clinician 
exiting MSSP ACO, % (95% 
CI) 
Risk 
difference* P value* 
1st percentile 13.2 (11.0, 15.3) -1.5 0.176 
5th percentile 13.2 (11.8, 14.5) -1.6 0.029 
10th percentile 13.3 (12.2, 14.4) -1.4 0.008 
25th percentile 13.8 (13.2, 14.5) -0.9 0.001 
50th percentile 14.7 (14.3, 15.1) -- † -- † 
75th percentile 16.4 (15.8, 17.0) 1.7 <0.001 
90th percentile 19.6 (18.2, 20.9) 4.9 <0.001 
95th percentile 23.1 (20.8, 25.4) 8.4 <0.001 
99th percentile 30.0 (24.9, 35.1) 15.3 <0.001 
* Risk differences were calculated as the difference between the probability of exit or entry for a given 
percentile of spending (e.g., 95th) to the probability of exit or entry for the 50th percentile of spending. 
‡ Clinicians in the 50th percentile of average spending was the referent. 
CI is Confidence Interval. 
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Table A6. Simulated changes in average MSSP beneficiary spending with attrition 
of high-cost clinicians from MSSP ACOs (2013-2014) 
 




















All clinicians 8,278 -- 37,243 3,803,968 
Excluding clinicians with ≥ 
99th of average spending 
8,229 -0.6 36,871 3,800,764 
Excluding clinicians with ≥ 
95th of average spending 
8,024 -3.1 35,381 3,761,548 
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Table A7. Simulated changes in average MSSP beneficiary spending when 

























Observed sample of MSSP 
clinicians 
8,278 -- 37,243 3,803,968 
Simulated sample including 
clinicians exiting MSSP and 
clinicians entering MSSP 
8,370 1.1 44,027 4,341,368 
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Supplemental Figure and Table Notes 
 
Figure A2. 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
High vs. low MSSP supply was defined by whether the attributed clinician’s median 
MSSP value was above (1=high) or equal to or below (0=low) the median MSSP supply 
value for the HRR over the entire post-period, which was designated independently for 
each HRR as beginning with the first quarter in which the HRR contained at least one 
clinician participating in the MSSP. Adjusted spending was estimated using a model that 
included market fixed effects, year fixed effects, seasonality, beneficiary characteristics, 
an indicator for each quarter, an indicator for high MSSP supply, and an interaction term 
between high MSSP supply and the quarter of interest, but did not impose an underlying 
time trend on the adjusted spending data. From these models, Stata’s –margins- 
command was used to estimate predicted spending for beneficiaries with high- vs. low-
MSSP supply in each quarter. 
 
Figure A3. 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
Adjusted spending trends were estimated using models that included market fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, seasonality, beneficiary characteristics, an indicator for each 
time period, an indicator for the beneficiary’s ultimate MSSP cohort status (0=never in 
an MSSP ACO, 1=2012 April cohort, 2=2012 July cohort, 3=2013 cohort, 4=2014 
cohort), and a fully-interacted term between the MSSP cohort indicator and the quarter 
of interest. From these models, Stata’s –margins- command was used to estimate 
predicted spending for beneficiaries in each MSSP cohort in each quarter. 
 
Figure A4. 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
 
Figure A5.  
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; MA, Medicare Advantage. 
In a supplemental analysis, changes in county-level MA penetration were estimated as 
a linear function of year fixed effects and county fixed effects. For purposes of graphical 
representation, changes in county-level MSSP and MA penetration were calculated 
using a first-differences model that used changes between the pre-MSSP period (2011) 
and the post-MSSP period (2014). 
 
Figure A6. 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
 
Figure A7 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; CI, confidence interval. 
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Mean outcomes for control beneficiaries were calculated as the intercept coefficient 
from adjusted longitudinal models with mean-centered covariates. Mean outcomes for 
MSSP beneficiaries were calculated as the sum of the control mean and the estimated 
effect of the MSSP on the outcome. All-cause hospitalization was defined as any 
inpatient stay. Preventable hospitalization was defined as hospitalization for any 1 of 11 
ambulatory care-sensitive conditions (ACSCs), as specified by the Agency for 
Healthcare Quality and Research (see Methods of Appendix A). All-cause 30-day 
readmission was defined according to MSSP specifications and limited to hospitalized 
beneficiaries (n= 5,902,749 beneficiary-quarters). 
. 
Figure A8. 
Abbreviations: MSSP, Medicare Shared Savings Program; ACO, accountable care 
organization. 
Spending in the prior 2 years (Panel A) and 3 years (Panel B) was defined as a rolling 
average of each clinician’s average Medicare care spending per beneficiary in the 2 or 3 
years prior to analysis, respectively. The probability of a clinician exiting the MSSP was 
estimated as a linear function of market fixed effects, year fixed effects, and prior 
spending. Adjusted analyses (Panel C) included the average beneficiary characteristics 
of the clinician’s panel, including average beneficiary age, sex, race/ethnicity (white, 
black, Hispanic, or other/unknown), disability, end-stage renal disease, dual-eligibility for 
Medicaid (months of enrollment), the CMS Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk 
score, and area-level poverty (proportion below federal poverty level) and education 
(proportion graduated from high school, college). A quadratic spending term was 
included to allow for any potential non-linearities in the effect of spending performance 
on MSSP participation. Analyses of MSSP exit were restricted to clinicians participating 
in the MSSP during the year prior to analysis and to ACOs entering MSSP contracts in 
2012 or 2013. 
 
Figure A9. 
Groups were defined by Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). Prior spending 
performance was defined as each group’s average Medicare spending per beneficiary 
per year in the one year prior to MSSP exit or entry determination. The probability of a 
group exiting or entering the MSSP was estimated as a linear function of market fixed 
effects, year fixed effects, and prior spending. A quadratic spending term was included 
to allow for any potential non-linearities in the effect of spending performance on MSSP 
participation. Analyses of MSSP exit (Panel A; N = 6,199 group-years) were restricted to 
groups participating in the MSSP during the year prior to analysis. Analyses of MSSP 
entry (Panel B; N = 89,026 group-years) were restricted to groups not participating in 
the MSSP during the year prior to analysis and did not include ACO formation, i.e., 
participation in an ACO’s first contract year. Both sets of analyses were restricted to 




Appendix B. Risk adjustment in Medicare ACO program deters coding increases 
but may lead ACOs to drop high-risk beneficiaries 
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Figure B5. Trends in risk score across beneficiaries in the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program (MSSP) and controls (2008-2014) 
Figure B6. Event study of change in risk score before and after attribution to the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Table B1. Characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries in the analytic sample vs. excluded 
sample (2008-2011). 
Table B2. Relationship between beneficiary risk score and beneficiary exit or entry in 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Figure B7. Heterogeneity in relationship between beneficiary risk score and exit from 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Figure B8. Relationship between beneficiary’s average risk score in prior two or three 
years and entry and exit in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
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Analysis of clinician average patient panel risk and entry and exit in the MSSP. 
We evaluated the relationship between the clinician’s patient panel and entry and exit in 
the MSSP in the following manner. First, we defined clinician participation in the MSSP 
using CMS’ Shared Savings Program Provider-Level Research Identifiable File, which 
lists the ACOs, provider groups, and clinicians participating in the MSSP. Second, 
defined each clinician’s patient panel, adapting MSSP attribution specifications to 
directly beneficiaries to the clinician from whom they received the plurality of eligible 
evaluation and management services (Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System 
codes: 99201 through 99215; 99304 through 99350; G0402; G0438; and G0439.)104 
Finally, we estimated the probability of clinician entry or exit as a linear function of the 
clinician’s patient panel’s average risk score, year fixed effects, market fixed effects, 
and average patient characteristics (age, sex, race/ethnicity, disability, end-stage renal 
disease, dual-eligibility for Medicaid, and area-level poverty, education, and Medicare 
Advantage penetration). 
 
Analyses of MSSP entry were restricted to clinicians not participating in the MSSP 
during the year prior to analysis and did not include ACO formation, i.e., participation in 
an ACO’s first contract year. Analyses of MSSP exit were restricted to clinicians 
participating in the MSSP during the year prior to analysis. Both sets of analyses were 
restricted to ACOs entering MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013, as 2012-2014 MSSP data 
could not be used to determine clinician exit or entry for ACOs formed in 2014. These 




in the analytic year(s), thus excluding clinicians who exit the MSSP due to retirement or 
death, for example. To improve statistical reliability of clinician-level estimates, our main 
specification used average patient characteristics in the three years prior to 
determination of MSSP entry or exit. We obtained similar results when using average 
patient characteristics in the prior year, average patient characteristics in the prior two 











Figure B2. Sensitivity analyses of relationship between beneficiary attribution to 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) and change in risk score 
 
Panel A. Change in count of Condition Categories (CC) 
 





Figure B3. Relationship between beneficiary risk score and beneficiary exit or 
entry in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) among beneficiaries 





Figure B4. Relationship between clinician’s average patient panel risk score and 





Figure B5. Trends in risk score across beneficiaries in the Medicare Shared 





Figure B6. Event study of change in risk score before and after attribution to the 





Table B1. Characteristics of Medicare beneficiaries in the analytic sample vs. 





(N=19,270,424) P value 
Patient characteristics Unadjusted mean Unadjusted mean 
 
Age, y (SD) 74.3 (10.6) 71.5 (12.8) <0.001 
Female 60.7%  56.5%  <0.001 
Race/Ethnicity 86.2%  
  
Non-Hispanic white 86.2%  80.5%  <0.001 
Non-Hispanic black  7.2%   9.8%  
 
Hispanic  3.7%   5.9%  
 
Other  2.9%   3.8%  
 
Dual-eligibility for 
Medicaid (months per 
year) 1.8 (4.2) 2.5 (4.7) <0.001 
Disability 19.7%  24.5%  <0.001 
End-stage renal disease  0.4%   1.4%  <0.001 
Area-level characteristics 23.1 (12.8) 
  
Medicare Advantage 23.1 (12.8) 23.8 (13.2) <0.001 
Below federal poverty 
level 13.9 (8.5) 14.8 (9.1) <0.001 
With high school degree 28.6 (16.0) 27.4 (15.9) <0.001 
With college degree 86.9 (8.3) 86.0 (9.0) <0.001 
Beneficiary outcomes 1.167 (0.901) 
  
HCC risk score 1.167 (0.901) 1.235 (1.142) <0.001 




Table B2. Relationship between beneficiary risk score and beneficiary exit or 
entry in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Average risk 
score in prior year 
Probability of 
beneficiary 










y|50th percentile) P value 
1st percentile 4.1 (4.0, 4.3) -0.3 0.002 0.94 <0.001 
5th percentile 4.3 (4.2, 4.3) -0.2 <0.001 0.96 <0.001 
10th percentile 4.3 (4.3, 4.4) -0.1 <0.001 0.97 <0.001 
25th percentile 4.4 (4.4, 4.4) 0.0 <0.001 0.99 <0.001 
50th percentile 4.4 (4.4, 4.4) -- -- -- -- 
75th percentile 4.5 (4.5, 4.5) 0.1 <0.001 1.02 <0.001 
90th percentile 4.7 (4.6, 4.7) 0.2 <0.001 1.05 <0.001 
95th percentile 4.8 (4.7, 4.9) 0.4 <0.001 1.09 <0.001 
99th percentile 5.4 (5.1, 5.6) 1.0 <0.001 1.21 <0.001 
Average risk 
score in prior year 
Probability of 
beneficiary exiting 











1st percentile 13.9 (13.5, 14.3) -2.1 <0.001 0.87 <0.001 
5th percentile 14.0 (13.7, 14.3) -2.0 <0.001 0.88 <0.001 
10th percentile 14.3 (14.0, 14.6) -1.7 <0.001 0.89 <0.001 
25th percentile 15.0 (14.8, 15.2) -1.0 <0.001 0.94 <0.001 
50th percentile 16.0 (15.9, 16.0) -- -- -- -- 
75th percentile 17.6 (17.4, 17.8) 1.7 <0.001 1.10 <0.001 
90th percentile 19.9 (19.5, 20.3) 3.9 <0.001 1.25 <0.001 
95th percentile 21.6 (21.0, 22.2) 5.6 <0.001 1.35 <0.001 





Figure B7. Heterogeneity in relationship between beneficiary risk score and exit 
from Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Panel A. ACO earned shared savings 
 





Panel C. ACO organizational structure 
 




Panel E. Beneficiary area-level income 
 









Figure B8. Relationship between beneficiary’s average risk score in prior two or 
three years and entry and exit in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) 
Panel A. Risk score in prior two years 
 




Table B3. Growth in risk score and beneficiary entry and exit to and from the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) between 2012 and 2014 
 
 
Growth in beneficiary risk score 
between 2012 and 2013 (%) 
P 
value 
Growth in beneficiary risk score 





Risk growth across MSSP status 
(%) 
 




MSSP 3.7 (3.5, 3.8) <0.001 5.8 (5.6, 6.0) <0.001 
Always in 
MSSP 3.3 (3.0, 3.7) <0.001 5.6 (5.2, 6.0) <0.001 
Entered 
MSSP 5.5 (4.9, 6.1) <0.001 7.2 (6.4, 7.9) <0.001 
Exited 
MSSP 8.2 (7.2, 9.2) <0.001 8.7 (7.6, 9.9) <0.001 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries never in MSSP (pp) 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries never in MSSP (pp) 
 
Always in 
MSSP -0.3 (-0.7, 0.0) 0.085 -0.1 (-0.5, 0.2) 0.436 
Entered 
MSSP 1.9 (1.3, 2.4) <0.001 1.4 (0.6, 2.2) <0.001 
Exited 
MSSP 4.5 (3.5, 5.5) <0.001 3.0 (1.8, 4.1) <0.001 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries always in MSSP (pp) 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries always in MSSP (pp) 
 
Entered 
MSSP 2.2 (1.6, 2.8) <0.001 1.6 (0.7, 2.4) <0.001 
Exited 
MSSP 4.8 (3.8, 5.9) <0.001 3.1 (1.9, 4.3) <0.001 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries entering MSSP (pp) 
 
Difference in growth relative to 
beneficiaries entering MSSP (pp) 
 
Exited 




Supplemental Figure and Table Notes 
  
Figure B1. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2008-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File; 
Leavitt Partners ACO Database; CMS’ Shared Savings Program Public-Use File. 
NOTES: HCC is Hierarchical Condition Category.  
 
Figure B2. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2008-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File; 
Leavitt Partners ACO Database; CMS’ Shared Savings Program Public-Use File. 
NOTES: Model specification is provided in the main text. High Medicare Advantage 
penetration was defined as residing in a county > 80th percentile for the share of fee-for-
service beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage. Percent change in risk score was 
measured as the estimated change in risk score relative to the average adjust risk score 
for MSSP beneficiaries in 2011 (prior to the program’s start). To better isolate the 
influence of coding on risk score, we estimated changes in the risk score component 
plausibly affected by coding practice (i.e., the count of Condition Categories that 
originate from provider-reported diagnoses) and excluded the components originating 
from administrative data (e.g., age, sex, disability status) (Panel A). Because ACOs also 
have an incentive to lower spending in the MSSP, we also evaluated changes in risk 
scores normalized by total price-standardized spending (Panel B). Total annual 
spending was the sum of spending for inpatient, outpatient, professional, and skilled 
nursing facility services and was price-standardized to account for variation resulting 
from regional wage indices and payments for indirect medical education, 
Disproportionate Share Hospitals, and new technologies. The error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. ACO is accountable 
care organization. CC is Condition Category.  
 
Figure B3. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: Model specification is described in the Supplemental Methods. The error bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. 
 
Figure B4. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Provider-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: Model specification is described in the Supplemental Methods. The error bars 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. 
 
Figure B5. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2008-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 




NOTES: These analyses graphed trends in adjusted risk score across four groups of 
beneficiaries: beneficiaries who joined in the MSSP in 2012; beneficiaries who joined in 
the MSSP in 2013; beneficiaries who joined in the MSSP in 2014; and controls who 
were never in the MSSP. Adjusted risk score was estimated using a model that included 
beneficiary fixed effects, time-varying area-level characteristics, an indicator for each 
year, an indicator for MSSP cohort (2012 cohort, 2013 cohort, 2014 cohort, control), and 
an interaction term between MSSP cohort and the year of interest, but did not impose 
an underlying time trend. From these models, Stata’s –margins– command was used to 
estimate predicted risk score for each cohort and in each year. The error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. HCC is 
Hierarchical Condition Category. 
 
Figure B6. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2008-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: We performed an event study to test for differential changes in risk score 
between MSSP beneficiaries vs. controls in the years prior to beneficiary attribution to 
MSSP ACOs. Estimates represent the association between eventual attribution to the 
MSSP and change in risk score in the years prior to and following attribution. Estimates 
are from a regression that includes indicators for the interaction between beneficiary 
MSSP attribution (ever/never) and time relative to MSSP attribution (where 1 = first year 
of attribution to MSSP), with additional controls for beneficiary fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and time-varying beneficiary characteristics (described in main text). The error 
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. 
ACO is accountable care organization. 
 
Table B1. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2008-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 




SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: Model specification is described in the Main Text. From these models, we 
estimated the probability of MSSP entry or exit across beneficiaries at the 1st, 5th, 10th, 
25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th, and 99th percentile of prior-year risk score. Risk ratios and 
risk differences were calculated by testing the difference between the probability of 
beneficiary exit or entry at a given risk score percentile (e.g., 95th percentile) vs. the 
probability of beneficiary exit or entry at the median risk score (50th percentile). MSSP is 
Medicare Shared Saving Program. ACO is accountable care organization. 
 
Figure B7. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 




NOTES: To measure heterogeneity in the relationship between risk score and exit, we 
estimated a single fully-interacted model that added to the base regression model 
(explained in the text) a series of interaction terms between risk score and each ACO 
and beneficiary characteristic listed in the exhibits. From this fully-interacted model, we 
estimated the probability of MSSP exit for beneficiaries in each group (e.g., in ACOs 
that earned shared savings) at the 1st, 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 99th, and 99th 
percentile of prior-year risk score. The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
MSSP is Medicare Shared Saving Program. ACO is accountable care organization. 
HCC is Hierarchical Condition Category. 
 
Figure B8. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: Models are estimated as described in the main text. However, in these 
sensitivity analyses, we estimated the probability of beneficiary exit or entry using 
average beneficiary risk score in either the prior two years (Panel A) or prior three years 
(Panel B). The error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. MSSP is Medicare Shared 
Saving Program. HCC is Hierarchical Condition Category. 
 
Table B3. 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of 2012-2014 data from: 20% sample of Medicare claims; 
the American Community Survey; CMS’ Beneficiary-level Shared Savings Program File. 
NOTES: Comparisons of beneficiaries who were always in the MSSP (through 2014), 
entered the MSSP (in 2014) or exited the MSSP (in 2014) were restricted to ACOs that 
entered MSSP contracts in 2012 or 2013. We excluded beneficiaries who formed ACOs 
that entered MSSP contracts in 2014, as we could not observe subsequent exit or entry 
in ACOs formed in 2014 using 2008-2014 data. Differences in risk score growth were 
examined using a linear spline model that included market fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, the previously described beneficiary characteristics, beneficiary MSSP status 
(always vs. never vs. enter vs. exit), splines for the years 2012-2013 (when no entry or 
exit occurred) and 2013-2014 (when entry or exit could occur), and an interaction 
between MSSP status and the two splines. We then tested for differences in risk score 
growth estimated from this fully-interacted spline model.
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Appendix C. Low-value care and clinician engagement in the Medicare Shared 
Savings Program: a survey of frontline clinicians 
 




Figure C1. CONSORT diagram 
 
Table C1. Survey domains and instrument sources 
 
Table C2. Awareness of ACO incentives 
 
Table C3. Perceived influence of ACO on practice 
 
Table C4. Perceived effect of ACO on quality improvement 
 
Table C5. List of recommendations against low-value care 
 




The survey’s target population included all clinicians listed as participants in the POM 
ACO administrative roster. This includes physicians, physician assistants, advanced 
practice nurses (nurse practitioners, certified nurse anesthetists, certified nurse 
midwives), and other clinicians (clinical social workers, psychologists, audiologists, 
podiatrists, optometrists, chiropractors, and physical therapists). We followed American 
Association for Public Research (AAPR) guidelines and standard definitions for 
determining response rates.98 We adopted the following standards for defining surveys 
as complete surveys, partial surveys, or break-off: 1) less than 50% of all critical 
questions were considered break-off; 2) 50%-75% were considered partial surveys; and 
3) more than 75% were considered complete surveys.98 
 
Of the 5,139 clinicians listed in the POM ACO administrative roster, we ruled 320 
clinicians ineligible for participation in the survey: 10 clinicians who were either 
members of the study team and/or participated in survey pre-testing; and 310 clinicians 
who we failed to contact with an invitation to take the survey (e.g., undeliverable/return 
to sender mailings). This resulted in 4,819 clinicians being ruled as eligible for the study. 
Of these 4,819 eligible clinicians, 1,620 clinicians submitted completed surveys. This 
yielded an AAPR RR1 response rate98 of 34% (complete responses/eligible 
respondents=1,620/4,819). Of these 4,819 eligible clinicians, we excluded 3,075 
clinicians who did not respond to the survey and 77 clinicians who began the survey but 
were considered survey break-offs. Our final sample of eligible respondents included 
1,620 complete responses and 50 partial responses, for a total of 1,667 eligible 
respondents. 
 
After survey administration, for the present analysis, we made the following additional 
exclusions to our initial sample of 1,667 eligible respondents. First, we included only 
those clinician types most frequently represented in the Choosing Wisely® campaign 
(i.e., physicians, physician assistants, advanced practice nurses), excluding the 112 
respondents who were other types of clinicians, namely clinical social workers, 
psychologists, audiologists, optometrists, podiatrists, chiropractors, physical therapists, 
and other/unknown (PhD, MBA, MHSA). Second, we excluded 111 pediatricians, as 
they are not typically included in Medicare initiatives targeting adult beneficiaries such 
as ACOs. Third, we excluded 90 respondents who selected specialties for which we did 
not present a block of Choosing Wisely® recommendations in the survey (i.e., medical 
genetics, nuclear medicine, other). Finally, we excluded 68 clinicians who responded 
“does not apply to my practice” for each Choosing Wisely® recommendation that they 
were shown during the survey, leaving 1,289 respondents. This left a final analytic 
sample of 1,289 respondents. From these respondents, we excluded responses of 
“does not apply to my practice” (18%; n=1,958 responses) from regression analyses. 
This left a final analytic sample of 8,448 recommendation-responses.
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Figure C1. CONSORT diagram 
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Table C1. Survey domains and instrument sources 
 
Survey domain Source of adapted instruments 
Domain 1: Reported ability to implement 
recommendations against low-value 
care 
The Choosing Wisely® campaign (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 
2017)86,92 
Domain 2: Involvement in ACO decision-
making 
“Survey of Physicians Participating in Medicare ACOs” 
(e.g., Schur, Sutton, 2017)48 
Domain 3: Awareness of ACO incentives “National Survey of Accountable Care Organization” 
(e.g., Colla et al., 2013)20 
“Survey of Physicians Participating in Medicare ACOs” 
(e.g., Schur, Sutton, 2017)48 
Domain 4: Perceived influence of ACO 
on practice 
 
“National Survey of Accountable Care Organization” 
(e.g., Colla et al., 2013)20 
“Survey of Physicians Participating in Medicare ACOs” 
(e.g., Schur, Sutton, 2017)48 
Domain 5: Perceived effect of ACO on 
quality 
“National Survey of Accountable Care Organization” 
(e.g., Colla et al., 2013)20 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
Domain 6: Perceived effect of ACO on 
satisfaction and practice outcomes 
(SteelFisher et al., 2009)87 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
Domain 7: Perceived state of health care 
system 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
Domain 8: Perceived responsibility to 
address health care costs, health care 
quality, and population health 
“Physicians, Health Care Costs, and Society” Survey 
(e.g., Tilburt et al., 2013)89 
“Survey of Physicians Participating in Medicare ACOs” 
(e.g., Schur, Sutton, 2017)48 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
Domain 9: Participation in ACO and 
other value-based reforms 
N/A 
Domain 10: Attitude toward health 
policy reform 
“Physicians, Health Care Costs, and Society” Survey 
(e.g., Tilburt et al., 2013)89 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
Domain 11: Clinician and organization 
characteristics 
“Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey 
of Primary Care Physicians” (Osborn et al., 2015)88 
“Community Tracking Study Physician Survey, 2004-
2005)”91 
“American Medical Association Physician Practice 2016 
Benchmark Survey”90 
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Domain 3: Awareness of ACO incentives 
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Domain 4: Perceived influence of ACO on practice 
 
 
Domain 5: Perceived effect of ACO on quality improvement 
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Domain 8: Perceived responsibility to address health care costs, health care 







Domain 9: Participation in ACO and other value-based reforms 
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Table C2. Awareness of ACO incentives 
 








Held accountable for both spending and quality. 296 
(23.0%) 
24 (1.9%) 969 (75.2%) 0.31 
Lowered spending in the most recent performance year 118 (9.2%) 20 (1.6%) 1151 
(89.3%) 
0.29 




12 (0.9%) 1059 
(82.2%) 
0.31 
Emphasized conducting Welcome to Medicare and Annual Wellness visits 42 (3.3%) 124 (9.6%) 1123 
(87.1%) 
0.31 
Does not face downside financial risk, i.e., cannot lose money 38 (2.9%) 294 
(22.8%) 
957 (74.2%) 0.30 





Average response: mean, 0.6, median, 0.0) 
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Table C3. Perceived influence of ACO on practice 












Joining an ACO has changed how I practice 
medicine 
652 (50.6%) 402 (31.2%) 216 (16.8%) 19 (1.5%) 0.54 
Joining an ACO has improved the quality of 
care my patients receive 
727 (56.4%) 372 (28.9%) 178 (13.8%) 12 (0.9%) 0.56 
Joining an ACO has made me more aware of 
controlling treatment costs 
840 (65.2%) 349 (27.1%) 96 (7.4%) 4 (0.3%) 0.58 
Joining an ACO has changed how I am 
compensated 
471 (36.5%) 453 (35.1%) 344 (26.7%) 21 (1.6%) 0.56 
I receive useful feedback on ACO cost and 
quality performance 
609 (47.2%) 429 (33.3%) 227 (17.6%) 24 (1.9%) 0.56 
ACO financial bonuses are large enough to 
influence my behavior 
536 (41.6%) 420 (32.6%) 307 (23.8%) 26 (2.0%) 0.54 
Average response: mean, 10.3, median, 10) 
 160 
Table C4. Perceived effect of ACO on quality improvement 
 










Coordinate care across care settings 18 (1.4%) 277 (21.5%) 210 (16.3%) 784 (60.8%) 0.49 
Decrease unnecessary hospitalizations 14 (1.1%) 252 (19.6%) 150 (11.6%) 873 (67.7%) 0.51 
Help patients manage care between visits 15 (1.2%) 240 (18.6%) 193 (15.0%) 841 (65.2%) 0.49 
Engage in shared decision-making 13 (1.0%) 296 (23.0%) 185 (14.4%) 795 (61.7%) 0.49 
Reduce inappropriate or harmful care 12 (0.9%) 261 (20.2%) 166 (12.9%) 850 (65.9%) 0.50 
Improve health of low-income patients 16 (1.2%) 224 (17.4%) 114 (8.8%) 935 (72.5%) 0.52 
Improve health of medically complex patients 21 (1.6%) 202 (15.7%) 202 (15.7%) 864 (67.0%) 0.49 
Average response: mean, 0.9, median, 0.0) 
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Table C5. List of recommendations against low-value care presented to respondents 
 
Specialty Recommendation against low-value care 
Allergy/Immunology Don’t diagnose or manage asthma without spirometry. 
Allergy/Immunology Don’t routinely prescribe antibiotics for acute mild-to-moderate sinusitis unless symptoms last for seven or more 
days, or symptoms worsen after initial clinical improvement. 
Allergy/Immunology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Anesthesiology Avoid admission or preoperative chest X rays for ambulatory patients with unremarkable history and physical exam. 
Anesthesiology Don’t obtain baseline laboratory studies in patients without significant systemic disease (ASA I or II) undergoing low-
risk surgery – specifically complete blood count, basic or comprehensive metabolic panel, coagulation studies when 
blood loss (or uid shifts) is/are expected to be minimal. 
Anesthesiology Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Anesthesiology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Cardiology Don’t perform annual stress cardiac imaging or advanced non-invasive imaging as part of routine follow-up in 
asymptomatic patients. 
Cardiology Don’t routinely prescribe lipid-lowering medications in individuals with a limited life expectancy. 
Cardiology Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Cardiology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Critical Care Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Critical Care Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Critical Care Don’t order diagnostic tests at regular intervals (such as every day), but rather in response to specific clinical 
questions. 
Critical Care Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Dermatology Don’t treat uncomplicated, nonmelanoma skin cancer less than 1 centimeter in size on the trunk and extremities 
with Mohs micrographic surgery. 
Dermatology Don’t routinely use topical antibiotics on a surgical wound. 
Dermatology Don’t use oral antibiotics for treatment of atopic dermatitis unless there is clinical evidence of infection. 
Dermatology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Emergency Medicine Don’t routinely prescribe antibiotics for acute mild-to-moderate sinusitis unless symptoms last for seven or more 
days, or symptoms worsen after initial clinical improvement. 
Emergency Medicine Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are present. 
Emergency Medicine Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Emergency Medicine Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Endocrinology Don’t prescribe testosterone therapy unless there is biochemical evidence of testosterone deficiency. 
Endocrinology Don’t routinely measure 1,25-dihydroxyvitamin D unless the patient has hypercalcemia or decreased kidney 
function. 
Endocrinology Don’t routinely order a thyroid ultrasound in patients with abnormal thyroid function tests if there is no palpable 
abnormality of the thyroid gland. 
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Endocrinology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Gastroenterology For pharmacological treatment of patients with gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), long-term acid 
suppression therapy (proton pump inhibitors or histamine2 receptor antagonists) should be titrated to the lowest 
effective dose needed to achieve therapeutic goals. 
Gastroenterology For a patient with functional abdominal pain syndrome (as per ROME IV criteria) computed tomography (CT) scans 
should not be repeated unless there is a major change in clinical findings or symptoms. 
Gastroenterology Do not repeat colorectal cancer screening (by any method) in average risk individuals for 10 years after a high-
quality colonoscopy that does not detect neoplasia. 
Gastroenterology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Hematology Don’t treat patients with immune thrombocytopenic purpura (ITP) in the absence of bleeding or a very low platelet 
count (<30,000/microL). 
Hematology Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Hematology Don’t treat with an anticoagulant for more than three months in a patient with a first venous thromboembolism (VTE) 
occurring in the setting of a major transient risk factor. 
Hematology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Hepatology Don’t perform surveillance esophagogastroduodenoscopy (EGD) in patients with compensated cirrhosis and small 
varices without red signs treated with non-selective beta blockers for preventing a first variceal bleed. 
Hepatology Don’t perform computed tomography or magnetic resonance imaging routinely to monitor benign focal lesions in the 
liver unless there is a major change in clinical findings or symptoms. 
Hepatology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Hepatology Don’t continue treatment for hepatic encephalopathy indefinitely after an initial episode with an identifiable 
precipitant. 
Infectious Disease Avoid testing for a Clostridium difficile infection in the absence of diarrhea. 
Infectious Disease Avoid prophylactic antibiotics for the treatment of mitral valve prolapse. 
Infectious Disease Don’t routinely prescribe antibiotics for acute mild-to-moderate sinusitis unless symptoms last for seven or more 
days, or symptoms worsen after initial clinical improvement. 
Infectious Disease Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Nephrology Don’t administer erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) to chronic kidney disease (CKD) patients with 
hemoglobin levels greater than or equal to 10 g/dL without symptoms of anemia. 
Nephrology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Nephrology Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Nephrology Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are present. 
Neurology Don’t use opioid or butalbital treatment for migraine except as a last resort. 
Neurology Don’t perform imaging of the carotid arteries for simple syncope without other neurologic symptoms. 
Neurology Don’t do imaging for uncomplicated headache. 
Neurology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 





Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 
Don’t treat patients who have mild dysplasia of less than two years in duration. 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology 
Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Oncology Don’t perform PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans in the staging of early prostate cancer at low risk for 
metastasis. 
Oncology Don’t perform surveillance testing (biomarkers) or imaging (PET, CT, and radionuclide bone scans) for 
asymptomatic individuals who have been treated for breast cancer with curative intent. 
Oncology Don’t use combination chemotherapy (multiple drugs) instead of chemotherapy with one drug when treating an 
individual for metastatic breast cancer unless the patient needs a rapid response to relieve tumor-related symptoms. 
Oncology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Ophthalmology Don’t routinely provide antibiotics before or after intravitreal injections. 
Ophthalmology Don’t place punctal plugs for mild dry eye before trying other medical treatments. 
Ophthalmology Don’t routinely order imaging tests for patients without symptoms or signs of significant eye disease. 
Ophthalmology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Otolaryngology Don’t obtain computed tomography (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in patients with a primary complaint 
of hoarseness prior to examining the larynx. 
Otolaryngology Don’t order computed tomography (CT) scan of the head/brain for sudden hearing loss. 
Otolaryngology Don’t prescribe oral antibiotics for uncomplicated acute external otitis. 
Otolaryngology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Pathology Don’t test vitamin K levels unless the patient has an abnormal international normalized ratio (INR) and does not 
respond to vitamin K therapy. 
Pathology Don’t perform low risk HPV testing. 
Pathology Don’t order multiple tests in the initial evaluation of a patient with suspected non-neoplastic thyroid disease. Order 
thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH), and if abnormal, follow up with additional evaluation or treatment depending on 
the findings. 
Pathology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
Don’t order repeat epidural steroid injections without evaluating the individual’s response to previous injections. 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are present. 
Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation 
Don’t prescribe opiates in acute disabling low back pain before evaluation and a trial of other alternatives is 
considered. 
Primary Care Don’t routinely prescribe antibiotics for acute mild-to-moderate sinusitis unless symptoms last for seven or more 
days, or symptoms worsen after initial clinical improvement. 
Primary Care Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the past six weeks, unless red flags are present. 
Primary Care Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Primary Care Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
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Psychiatry Don’t use benzodiazepines or other sedative-hypnotics in older adults as a first choice for insomnia, agitation or 
delirium. 
Psychiatry Don’t prescribe antipsychotic medications to patients for any indication without appropriate initial evaluation and 
appropriate ongoing monitoring. 
Psychiatry Don’t routinely prescribe two or more antipsychotic medications concurrently. 
Psychiatry Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Pulmonology Don’t diagnose or manage asthma without spirometry. 
Pulmonology For patients recently discharged on supplemental home oxygen following hospitalization for an acute illness, don’t 
renew the prescription without assessing the patient for ongoing hypoxemia. 
Pulmonology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Pulmonology Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Radiation Oncology Don’t routinely recommend proton beam therapy for prostate cancer outside of a prospective clinical trial or registry. 
Radiation Oncology Don’t routinely use extended fractionation schemes (>10 fractions) for palliation of bone metastases. 
Radiation Oncology Don’t recommend radiation following hysterectomy for endometrial cancer patients with low-risk disease. 
Radiation Oncology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Radiology Don’t recommend follow-up imaging for clinically inconsequential adnexal cysts. 
Radiology Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are present. 
Radiology Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Radiology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Rheumatology Don’t perform MRI of the peripheral joints to routinely monitor inflammatory arthritis. 
Rheumatology Don’t test for Lyme disease as a cause of musculoskeletal symptoms without an exposure history and appropriate 
exam findings. 
Rheumatology Don’t prescribe biologics for rheumatoid arthritis before a trial of methotrexate (or other conventional non-biologic 
DMARDs). 
Rheumatology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Surgery Don’t administer packed red blood cells (PRBCs) in a young healthy patient without ongoing blood loss and 
hemoglobin of ≥ 6 g/dL unless symptomatic or hemodynamically unstable. 
Surgery Avoid admission or preoperative chest X rays for ambulatory patients with unremarkable history and physical exam. 
Surgery Don’t image for suspected pulmonary embolism (PE) without moderate or high pre-test probability of PE. 
Surgery Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Urology Don’t obtain computed tomography scan of the pelvis for asymptomatic men with low-risk clinically localized 
prostate cancer. 
Urology Don’t prescribe testosterone to men with erectile dysfunction who have normal testosterone levels. 
Urology Don’t recommend cancer screening in adults with life expectancy of less than 10 years. 
Urology Don’t routinely perform PSA-based screening for prostate cancer. 
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   Male 1,492 (66%) 754 (34%) 
 





   Non-Physician 1,058 (68%) 509 (32%) 
 





   Michigan Medicine 1,743 (57%) 1,303 (43%) 
 
   Integrated Health Associates 430 (79%) 117 (21%) 
 
   Huron Valley Physicians Association 406 (88%) 58 (13%) 
 
   MidMichigan Health 181 (82%) 41 (18%) 
 
   St Mary's of Michigan 115 (88%) 15 (12%) 
 
   Answer Health 106 (85%) 19 (15%) 
 
   Wexford-Crawford PHO 67 (66%) 34 (34%) 
 
   Oakland Southfield Physicians 78 (78%) 22 (22%) 
 
   United Physicians 58 (87%) 9 (13%) 
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